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Abstract
The multiple corporate collapses and scandals of recent years, for which “En-
ron” is a convenient shorthand, resulted from a perfect storm in which regulatory
oversight, the law of ﬁduciary duty, gatekeepers, market discipline, and contrac-
tual incentives all failed to prevent gross self-dealing, conﬂicts of interest, and
deception, or themselves produced perverse consequences. The story of this si-
multaneous failure of the structures in place since the New Deal and before, has
received considerable attention in both the popular and scholarly literature, but is
summarized here to provide a context for consideration of the contributions that
lawyers made to the perfect storm. The contribution of lawyers has received less
attention than that of gatekeepers such as auditors and research analysts, perhaps
because their complex role as both advocates and gatekeepers does not lend itself
to a relatively simple morality tale, as did the failures of the auditors and analysts.
This article attempts to identify the various types of failures by lawyers in these
cases, and argues that there is no single way to describe or explain them; lawyers
contributed to the perfect storm in at least several different ways. This complex-
ity suggests that the SEC’s new professional standards for lawyers, while perhaps
helpful, do not provide a comprehensive solution to the problems that produced a




People steal.  People cheat.  Then they lie about it.  When they can steal, cheat and lie in 
a big way, they do it.  When people can steal, cheat and lie behind the protective facade of the 
corporation, they really do it.  The concentration of wealth and power in public corporations, 
when combined with the separation of ownership and control and the consequent diminishment 
of accountability, creates, almost by definition, a gigantic moral hazard.  This is nothing new.  So 
why should we be startled or even particularly troubled by the wave of corporate scandals for 
which the word “Enron” is a convenient shorthand?
History shows us that corporate scandals have developed symbiotically with the 
corporation, from the antics of the railroad barons of the mid-nineteenth century through the 
scandals of today.  To suggest that there was a golden age of corporate probity, in which the 
norms governing the behavior of managers were somehow more stringent than today's norms, 
may be indulging a fantasy.  Economics, as well as history, should preclude such fantasies.  
Neoclassical theory of the firm teaches that while the public corporation is a useful nexus of 
contracts,
1 it is abuse-prone, because the separation of ownership and control inevitably produces 
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1 This basic principle derives from Ronald Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 Economica (N.S.) 
386 (1937). The legal consequences of the principle are elaborated in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989) which also cites much of the leading 
economic and legal literature.– 2 –
substantial agency costs.
2  The managers of such firms, each of which is a rational homo 
economicus, and a person who does not have the same interests as the owners of the firm, tend to 
maximize their own utility rather than that of the shareholders by self-dealing and shirking, 
through devices both subtle and blatant, such as undue risk avoidance, conflict-of-interest 
transactions or (my favorite) consumption of excess perquisites.  Indeed, the central problem of 
corporate law has been that of defining how agency costs can be controlled, and everyone 
recognizes that the task is not an easy one.
3
It also may be that at least some of the recent cases were unique examples of unusually 
bad corporate governance, not a general failure of corporate governance.  As Professor John 
Coffee pointed out,
Enron's governance structure was sui generis.  Other public corporations simply 
have not authorized their chief financial officer to run an independent entity that 
enters into billions of dollars of risky and volatile trading transactions with them; 
nor have they allowed their senior officers to profit from such self-dealing 
transactions without broad supervision or even comprehension of the profits 
involved.  Nor have other corporations incorporated thousands of subsidiaries and 
employed them in a complex web of off-balance sheet partnerships.
4
2 The classic article on agency costs is Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
3 There are, of course, different schools of thought about how and the extent to which corporate 
law should play a role in controlling agency costs.  For a concise explanation of the different approaches 
of the neo-classical, managerialist, transaction cost and political theory schools, see William A. Klein & 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Business Organization and Finance 172-178 (8
th ed., 2000).
4 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 Bus. Law 
1403 (2002) at 1403.http://www.law.columbia.edu/law-economicstudies.  For more detailed discussion of 
the implications of Enron's extraordinarily bad corporate governance, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon,
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233 (2003).  For an insider's view of Enron's unusually dysfunctional 
corporate  culture,  see  Mimi  Swartz  with  Sherron  Watkins,  Power  Failure,  The  Inside  Story  of  the 
Collapse of Enron (2003) (Watkins was the key whistleblower at Enron).– 3 –
The problem presented by Enron may simply be one of determining why some boards are 
so much worse than others, not whether there has been some systemic breakdown of corporate 
governance.
So why be surprised about Enron and its progeny, and why believe that something 
fundamental has been altered, requiring major changes in our system of corporate governance?  
One answer may be that the scale, rapidity and pervasive impact of these corporate collapses 
seem unprecedented and radical.  The dimension of the collapses, however, can be partially 
accounted for by the violent bursting of the economic bubble on which some of these companies 
rose, particularly technology firms such as WorldCom and Global Crossing, rather than defects 
in corporate governance, which may never have been detected if rising markets continued to 
mask all sins.  But the burst bubble does not account for all of the current disenchantment. The 
widespread disillusionment caused by the bubble bursting was exacerbated by a pervasive sense 
of deceit and corruption in the highest reaches of corporate America.
Most disturbing has been the sense of systems failure, of a thorough breakdown of all the 
mechanisms designed to control agency costs, to prevent corporate managers from using other 
peoples' money in their own interests to the massive detriment of shareholders, employees, home 
communities and everyone else effected by their behavior.  It may be that Enron was unusual, 
but it had many successors in disaster, suggesting that something about the failure was systemic, 
and not idiosyncratic.  The world of Enron and the others was a world swept by a perfect storm
5
5 The term “perfect storm” is taken from the bestseller about an unusually violent storm in the 
Atlantic Ocean and the fate of fishermen caught in it.  Sebastian Unger, The Perfect Storm: A True Story 
of Men Against the Sea (1997).  Dean Nancy B. Rapoport, however, writes that the “‘perfect storm’ 
metaphor [as applied to Enron] irks me to no end,” apparently because it was used by an Enron executive 
in a self-exculpatory manner .  Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic and The Perfect Storm, 71 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1373, 1375 (2003).  She maintains “that what brought Enron down - at least as far as we know -
wasn't a once-in-a-lifetime alignment of elements beyond its control.  Rather, Enron's demise was a – 4 –
in which regulatory restraints, fiduciary obligation, market discipline, contractual incentives and 
professional gatekeepers all simultaneously failed to produce their intended beneficial effects.
My principal goal in this paper is to consider the contribution to the perfect storm of one 
particular group of gatekeepers, the lawyers who represented Enron and the other corporate 
malefactors.  I will then offer some tentative conclusions about the potential usefulness of the 
attorney whistle-blowing rules Congress has required the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to adopt in response to its perception of those lawyers' ethical and professional failures.  
Consideration of the lawyers' failures, however, must be contextualized by first trying to 
understand the other failures that constituted the perfect storm.
I. THE PERFECT STORM
A.  The Failure of Law
The elements of this perfect storm are by now clear.  First, the federal regulatory 
framework inherited from the New Deal to ensure that public companies produce and 
disseminate accurate, material information into the marketplace about the companies' financial 
condition failed to extract the kind of information needed to allow the market to detect the 
fundamental problems with Enron and the other corporations that so suddenly turned success 
into disaster.  The reasons why the mandatory disclosure system administered by the SEC failed 
synergistic  combination  of  human  errors  and  hubris;  a  Titanic  miscalculation,  rather  than  a  ‘perfect 
storm.’”  Id.  I think Dean Rapoport is taking her metaphors a little too seriously.  The term “ perfect 
storm” is not used here to suggest that this was some sort of unique event that just “happened” to Enron.  
It is used here as a  metaphor, through which the simultaneous and virtually complete failures of both 
external  regulatory  and  internal  self-regulatory  systems  (in  some  cases  because  of  human  error  and 
hubris, and in others because of the defects in those systems) can be compared to the concatenation of 
weather forces that produced Unger's perfect storm.  My use of the metaphor is not an attempt to deflect 
responsibility from the pirates (to continue the nautical metaphors ad nauseam) whose arrogance and 
dishonesty ultimately sunk Enron.  Furthermore, while quibbling about metaphors is perhaps a little silly, 
I would suggest that insistence on comparison of the Enron debacle to the tragicomedy of human errors in 
the sinking of the Titanic underestimates the importance of the systemic failures that allowed the malign 
leadership of Enron to produce such an enormous disaster.– 5 –
are numerous and complex.  They range from the inherent difficulty of contending with 
determined and sophisticated fraud, to the excessive plasticity of accounting standards that 
allowed the financial condition of issuers to be obscured in an apparently legal manner,
6 to the 
atrophy of the auditing function that was supposed to ensure the quality of the information fed 
into the disclosure system,
7 to a market euphoria that kept attention away from the danger 
signals,
8Coffee, supra n. 4, at 17. to the limitations of an SEC not equal to its oversight and 
enforcement responsibilities.
9
6 See, however, William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tulane 
L. Rev. 1275,1340-48 (2002), where it is argued that the primary problem was not primarily with the 
substance of the accounting rules, but with Enron's failure to follow them.  But see the following analyses 
of  how  Enron  apparently  followed  the  existing  rules  to  produce  highly  undesirable  results:  Daniel 
Altman, Enron Had More Than One Way to Disguise the Rapid Rise in Debt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2002, 
at A1 (citing Enron's use of existing accounting rules to avoid treating swap exchanges as debt); Floyd 
Norris & Joseph Cohn, Rule Makers Take on Loopholes That Enron Used in Hiding Debt, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 14, 2002 at A1 (citing Enron's use of the “3% Rule” to keep the liabilities of its special purpose 
entities  out  of  its  financial  statements  as  debt).    The  argument  has  also  been  made  that  certain 
questionable accounting decisions had been made, and were justifiable, because other companies in the 
same industry were allegedly doing the same thing.  WorldCom, Inc., for example, apparently treated 
“line charges” (charges for using other phone networks) as capital expenses rather than operating costs, 
allowing the company (allegedly) to claim $5 billion in profit during a three-year period in which it was 
losing money.  In pleading not guilty to fraud charges WorldCom's former CFO asserted this “everybody 
was doing it” defense.  See Brooke A. Masters, Officer Pleads Not Guilty; Sullivan's Trial Put Off Until 
2004, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 2003, at E01.
7 See discussion of this problem infra at 33-38.
8 In particular, market euphoria compromises or even destroys the effectiveness of gatekeepers 
such as auditors, lawyers and securities analysts, as Professor Coffee has pointed out:
Indeed,  in  an  atmosphere  of  euphoria  in  which  stock  prices  ascend 
endlessly  and  exponentially,  gatekeepers  are  largely  a  nuisance  to 
management, which does not need them to attract investors.  Gatekeepers 
are necessary only when investors are cautious and skeptical, and in a 
market bubble, caution and skepticism are largely abandoned.
9 See Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Financial Oversight 
of Enron: The SEC and Private Sector Watchdogs (October 8, 2002) at 29-68, (hereinafter Financial
Oversight Report) for a critical evaluation of the SEC's performance with respect to Enron.– 6 –
Second, reliance on the concept of fiduciary duty, a legally enforceable obligation 
designed to protect shareholders from the self-seeking behavior of corporate officers and 
directors, seems to have been misguided, at best.  The duty of loyalty imposed little restraint on 
officers who extracted huge sums from the company for their personal benefit in the form of 
“loans,” cash payments or lavish perks,
10 rammed through lucrative conflict-of-interest 
transactions,
11 manipulated financial data to prop up the stock price to boost the value of their 
options, or dumped their stock before the bad news of their mismanagement or financial 
deception became public.
12  Similarly, the duty of care had little impact on the directors of these 
corporations, particularly independent directors who allowed all of this malfeasance to take place 
on their watch.
13
10 The  most  notorious  recent  example  of  this  behavior  is  perhaps  that  of  Adelphia 
Communications, where the founders of a public company used their control over the board to secure 
approval of millions of dollars worth of unjustifiable personal loans and other benefits to the CEO and his 
family.  The CEO has challenged this characterization of his dealings with the corporation.  See Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Fallen Founder of Adelphia Tries to Explain, N.Y. Times, April 7, 2003 at C1.
11 The conflict of interest transactions benefitting Enron senior executives and approved at their 
request are by now well-known.  For analysis of how senior executives benefitted from such transactions 
and how they deceived the board of directors (which also failed in its oversight functions), see the report 
prepared by a special board committee chaired by William F. Powers, Jr., Report of Investigation by the 
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (February 1, 2002), at 148-77 
(hereinafter Powers Report).  Particularly questionable was the Enron's board's willingness to suspend the 
corporation's own code of ethics in order to avoid the conflict of interest rules that would have precluded 
board approval of certain major transactions that benefitted the chief financial officer.  See A. Larry 
Elliott & Richard J. Schroth, How Companies Lie 100-01 (2003).
12 Whether officers or directors (particularly independent directors) will be held liable under the 
federal securities laws for such insider trading, however, remains to be seen as of this writing.  In the case 
of In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative, and ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002), the 
court dismissed shareholders' claims that the independent directors of Enron sold stock based on inside 
information  about  the  company's  financial  condition.    The  court  found  that  the  complaint  nowhere 
asserted facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter for any of the independent directors.
13 For strong criticism of the performance of the Enron board of directors, see Report Prepared 
by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs  United 
States Senate, The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse (July 8, 2002) (hereinafter Role of 
the Board Report).  The report concluded that:– 7 –
B.  Market Failure
The perfect storm involved more, however, than a failure of law, whether it was federal 
securities law or state law of fiduciary obligation.  It was also a case of market failure, which, for 
some, is a more serious problem.  Critics of regulatory intervention into corporate governance 
[M]uch that was wrong with Enron was known to the Board, from high 
risk  accounting  practices  and  inappropriate  conflict  of  interest 
transactions,  to  extensive  undisclosed  off-the-books  activity  and 
excessive executive compensation....[T]he Enron Board failed to provide 
the  prudent  oversight  and  checks  and  balances  that  its  fiduciary 
obligations required and a company like Enron needed.  By failing to 
provide sufficient oversight and restraint to stop management excess, the 
Enron Board contributed to the company's collapse and bears a share of 
the responsibility for it.
Role of the Board Report at 59.
The extent to which the independence of the Enron Board, and its willingness to exercise its 
monitoring function, was compromised by personal and financial ties between supposedly independent 
directors  and  key  executives  remains  to  be  determined.    See  Richard  W.  Stevenson  &  Jeff  Gerth, 
Safeguards Failed to Detect Problems at Enron, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2002 at A1.
The ability of a board of directors to meet its fiduciary obligations of care, furthermore, can be 
compromised  when  the  officers  and  their  professional  advisers  do  not  provide  the  board  with  the 
information it needs to do its job, particularly when they are motivated to withhold data that might reveal 
their  conflicts  of  interest.    This  may  have  been  why  the  board  of  Global  Crossing  failed  to 
“comprehensively address the implications of [certain questionable] transactions, in the aggregate, for the 
company's overall financial position, until it was too late to take remedial action if it chose to do so.”  See 
Report of the Special Committee on Accounting Matters to the Board of Directors of Global Crossing 
Ltd., Global Crossing's Response to Olafson's Allegations (Feb. 18, 2003) Tab 3, at 15 (hereinafter Global 
Crossing  Report).    Professor Jeffrey  N.  Gordon  has  argued,  however, that  among  the  Enron  board's 
principal governance failures was its willingness to approve an “opaque” disclosure policy while also 
authorizing a managerial compensation strategy highly dependent on stock price changes that, as a result 
of Enron's opaque disclosures, did not reflect material information about the issuer, while itself declining 
to intensely monitor the company's highly complex operations and financial practices.  Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, Columbia 
Law  School  Center  for  Law  and  Economic  Studies,  Working  Paper  No.  216, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=391363 (March 2003) (forthcoming 33 Conn. L. Rev.).– 8 –
insist, after all, that the problem of agency costs is best resolved through a combination of market 
discipline and private contracting.
14
1.  The Limitations of Market Discipline
Corporate managers are disciplined, some argue, by the operation of the market for 
corporate control, which compels managers to maximize shareholder value at the risk of losing 
control.
15  There was always an element of overstatement in these theories of market discipline 
because the takeover phenomenon has been explained in different ways that have nothing to do 
with the disciplinary hypothesis,
16 but, the limitations of market discipline as a means of aligning 
14 The body of contractarian thought that emphasizes the efficiency of private contracting as 
opposed to government intervention in corporate governance through mandatory as distinct from enabling 
rules derives from Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).  A comprehensive 
elaboration of the contractarian approach to corporate law is Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991).  For a critical analysis of the contractarian approach, see 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 
89 Columbia L. Rev. 1618 (1989).
15 The pioneering article arguing that the disciplinary impact of the market for corporate control 
is an important means of controlling agency costs is Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. Political Economy 110 (1965). Empirical evidence supporting the thesis that 
corporate takeovers have the effect of replacing poor managers can be found in Kenneth J. Martin and 
John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Managerial Turnover, 46 J. Fin. 
671 (1991).  For an argument that recognition of takeovers as a method of monitoring management 
performance requires a rule of managerial passivity in response to a hostile tender offer, see Frank H. 
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).  For versions of this argument that recognize the importance of the 
monitoring influence of the market for corporate control, but argue against a rule of pure passivity, see 
Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offers Defense, 35 Stanford 
L. Rev. 51 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and 
Extension, 35 Stanford L. Rev. 23 (1982).
16 For an excellent overview of the literature and excerpts from some of the key articles, see 
Roberta Romano, Foundations of Corporate Law 221-57 (1993).  It has been argued that the recent wave 
of corporate fraud is at least partially attributable to the demise of the hostile takeover as a disciplinary 
mechanism as a result of the wave of antitakeover regulation in the 1980s and 1990s.  See Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 55 (2002).  Professor Ribstein argues that the recent spate of corporate fraud was 
not caused by market failure, but by prior regulatory intervention into corporate governance that gutted 
the effectiveness of an important market mechanism of managerial discipline.  Professor Ribstein has 
extended that critique of prior regulatory interventions to a critique of the most recent Congressional – 9 –
managerial and shareholder interests became particularly obvious in light of the gross 
misbehavior of corporate managers in the recent debacles.
Also obvious are the limitations of the theory that firms' private incentives to disclose 
accurate information are sufficient to ensure transparency in corporate disclosure.  Undoubtedly, 
most firms recognize that deceptive disclosure is costly, because eventually it will be detected, 
diminishing the firm's credibility and producing uncertainty about the value of its securities.  The
uncertainty discount will then increase its cost of raising capital.  Supposedly, this private 
incentive for truth-telling is so powerful that it renders a government-mandated disclosure 
system unnecessary.
17  The incentive to disseminate accurate information may be sufficient in 
most cases, but recent experience suggests that the private incentives for deception can be 
equally powerful, at least under some circumstances.  Those circumstances include situations in 
which senior managers can benefit enormously in the short term from increases in the stock 
price, even if those increases are short-lived.  They include cases of over-optimism, in which 
managers believe that future improvements in operations or financial condition will eventually 
response to the market excesses of the last few years.  He suggests that the post-Enron legislation may be 
similar to the misconceived regulatory responses to the bursting of previous market bubbles.  See Larry E. 
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Houston L. Rev. 77-79 (2003) (“In each case, regulation was passed without 
due  consideration  either  to  the benefits or  costs  of  regulation,  and it  likely  constrained  the  market's 
recovery from the crash.”)
17 The leading articles arguing that SEC-mandated disclosure under the Securities Act of 1933 
for new issues  was superfluous were George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. 
Bus.  117  (1969);  Greg  Jarrell,  the  Economic  Effects  of  Federal  Regulation  of  the  Market  for  New 
Securities Issues, 24 J.L. & Econ. 613 (1981).  Se also George Benston, Required Disclosure and the 
Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which found that SEC-mandated 
disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act by already-public companies was of no apparent value to 
investors.    For  a  comprehensive  critique  by  legal  scholars  of  the  alleged  benefits  of  the  mandatory 
disclosure  system,  see  Frank  H.  Easterbrook  and  Daniel  R.  Fischel,  Mandatory  Disclosure  and  the 
Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1989).  For a rejoinder that is more sanguine about the 
benefits of the system, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1989).– 10 –
resolve the problems that are inadequately disclosed or even misrepresented.
18  Most important, 
perhaps, are the situations in which secretiveness, truth-trimming and even outright deception 
have become part of the corporate culture, so that public dissembling becomes entirely 
normative.  This may seem irrational, but we know from the insights of behavioral economics 
that in the financial world the irrational can seem perfectly rational.
19  It seems obvious from 
recent experience that the irrational has seemed rational to at least some corporate managers, 
with disastrous consequences for the quality of corporate disclosure.
2.  Stock Option Compensation and Perverse Incentives
Even more obvious has been the failure of the principal contractual mechanism for 
controlling agency costs: executive stock options.  Stock option compensation seemed a brilliant, 
non-regulatory solution to the problem of how to provide managers with the incentive to 
maximize shareholder value.  One commentator has described the premises of stock option 
18 For a concise analysis of the cognitive biases that produce over-optimism and poor decisions 
among  corporate  managers,  see  Dan  Lovallo  and  Daniel  Kahneman,  Delusions  of  Success:  How 
Optimism Undermines Executive Decisions, Harv. Bus. Rev., July 2003, at 56.
19 The leading texts in the emerging field of “behavioral finance” are Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient 
Markets:  An  Introduction  to  Behavioral  Finance  (2000);  Hersh  Sheffrin,  Beyond  Greed  and  Fear: 
Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing.  An interesting application of these 
theories is Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (1999).  Professor Donald C. Langevoort has drawn upon 
the insights of behavioral finance to question the basic premises of the efficient market hypothesis, upon 
which most theories of market discipline depend. (For an exposition of that thesis and its significance for 
regulation of public corporations and securities markets, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The
Mechanisms  of  Market  Efficiency,  70.  Va.  L.  Rev.  549  (1989)).    Langevoort  proposes  instead  an 
inefficient  market  hypothesis,  which  would  form  the  basis  for  what  he  calls  “behavioral  securities 
regulation,” which would acknowledge the cognitive biases of both persons involved in issuing securities 
and investors.   Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Market, 97 Nw. L. Rev. 
135, 140 (2002)  See however, Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
University  of  Michigan  John  M.  Olin  Center  for  Law  &  Economics,  Working  Paper  No.  03-002, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=358442 (2003) (forthcoming Stan. L. Rev.), who argue that recognition of 
behavioral biases within securities markets should not necessarily lead to greater regulatory intervention 
in those markets, because regulators (particularly monopolistic regulators such as the SEC) suffer from 
their own behavioral biases.– 11 –
compensation succinctly, albeit ironically when he explained that: “once endowed with a 
generous grant of these wonderful instruments, a senior executive would no longer think of 
himself as a mere hired hand but as a proprietor who had the long term health of the firm at 
heart.  That was the theory, anyway.”
20  Instead of being a shirking, risk-avoiding bureaucratic 
time-server, interested only in his own salary and perks and not in maximizing shareholder value, 
the manager/option-holder would profit with the shareholder from the increased value the now-
entrepreneurial manager's efforts would generate.
While stock option arrangements can be complex, the basic agreement is simple, as the 
following description shows:
[a]n executive stock option is a legal contract that grants its owner 
the right to buy a stock in his or her company at a certain price (the 
“strike price”) on a certain date in the future.  Take a company 
with a stock price of fifty dollars that grants its chief executive the 
right to buy a million shares three years hence at the current market 
price.  Assume the stock price rises by ten per cent each year, so 
that after three years it is trading at about sixty-six dollars and fifty 
cents.  At that point, the chief executive can “exercise” his option 
and make the company sell him a million shares at fifty dollars.  
Then he can sell the shares in the open market and clear a profit of 
sixteen and a half million dollars.
21
20 John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle: How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to Go 
Astray, The New Yorker, Sept. 23, 2002 at 64, 68. This article is an excellent journalistic account of the 
perverse effects of the stock option compensation arrangements of the 1990s.  For further analysis of 
those effects  and their damage to both shareholder and social welfare, see also Lawrence Mitchell, 
Corporate  Irresponsibility  8-9,  109-11,  223-25  (2001).    These  critiques  fly  in  the  face  of  much 
conventional wisdom that favored the use of stock option compensation.  For examples of the literature 
on executive compensation question, including the role of stock option compensation, see Jennifer N. 
Carpenter & David L. Yermack (eds.), Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and 
Evidence  (1999).    For  a  concise  survey  of  the  arguments  pro  and  con  regarding  stock  option 
compensation, see Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, the Determinants of Shareholder Voting on 
Stock Option Plans, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 40-46 (2000).  For arguments that the largest component 
of directors' compensation should be in the form of stock options, see Nat'l Ass'n of Corp. Dirs., Report of 
the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Compensation 15 (1995); Charles M. Elson, The Duty 
of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 649, 652-53 (1995).
21 Cassidy, supra note 20, at 68.– 12 –
Stock option arrangements thus blew off the ceiling on potential executive compensation, to 
managers' delight.  They were equally delightful from the corporation's standpoint.  Stock 
options did not have to be treated as an expense for accounting purposes, unlike executive 
salaries, allowing corporate earnings to be goosed upward.
22
Beginning around 1990, stock options began to take off as the principal method of 
compensating senior executives, dwarfing cash salary payments in significance.
23  Once installed 
throughout corporate America, stock option arrangements caused executive compensation to 
balloon wildly.  The gross disproportion between senior executive pay and that received by 
everyone else caused plenty of controversy,
24 but that was only one problem.  Serious as it was, 
it merely formed a backdrop to the most dangerous dilemma: stock option programs not only 
failed to meet their avowed goal of aligning managerial and shareholder interests, they created 
perverse incentives for abusing shareholders.
22 The question of whether options should be expensed to reduce earnings became controversial 
in the 1990s, but no meaningful change in the rule was achieved.  See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing 
Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 Tulane L. 
Rev.  1579,  1605  n.  73  (2002)  and  the  authorities  cited  therein.    Post-Enron,  however,  serious 
consideration of changing the accounting rule began.  See note 32 infra.
23 See  Richard  H.  Wagner  and  Catherine  G.  Wagner,  Recent  Developments  in  Executive, 
Director and Employee Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns for Corporate Directors, 3 Stan. J. L. 
Bus. and Fin. 5, 6-7 (1997); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of 
Incentive Compatability, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 442 (2000).
24 For a thorough critique of this disproportion and it effects, even before the post-1990 boom in 
stock option compensation, see Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess (1991).  For a more recent critique 
of the gap and its economic and social effects, see Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four 
Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 115 (2002).  There is some evidence, however, that the recession that began in 2001 
has begun to reduce average CEO compensation, both because of reduced payouts of performance-related 
bonuses and because so many stock options are under water.  See Special Report, Executive Pay, Bus. 
Week, April 21, 2003 at 86 (reporting a 33% decline in average CEO pay packages).  Shareholders have 
also begun to use the SEC proxy mechanism to challenge executive compensation arrangements.  See 
Executive Pay: Labor Strikes Back, Bus. Week, May 26, 2003, at 46.– 13 –
For example, some corporations indulged in the practice of repricing executives' stock 
options so that they would still be able to exercise their options profitably when the stock price 
fell.
25  Managers thus benefited whether the stock price went up or down, although the 
shareholders only profited when the price went up.  It was a kind of “heads I win, tails you lose” 
scenario, in which the notion that options made managers' and shareholders' interests congruent 
became laughable.  Even in the absence of repricing, the use of stock options created an 
incentive to use accounting devices designed to prop up the stock price
26It should also be noted that 
compensation schemes other than stock option arrangements can have similarly perverse effects.  Enron, 
for example, used a program of one-time cash bonus payments to senior executives (its “Performance 
Unit Plan”) as a reward for hitting stock-price targets.  Apparently over $320 million of such cash 
payments were made during the year preceding Enron's bankruptcy, the time when the company was 
making some of its most misleading accounting decisions and financial disclosures in order to meet stock-
price expectations.  See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid Huge Bonuses in ’01; Experts See a Motive for 
Cheating, N.Y. Times, March 1, 2002, at A1. in the short term just long enough to allow quick and 
25 Naturally, this practice has excited criticism.  See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The 
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1880 (1992).  Note, however, that such 
repricing  apparently  has  been  relatively  uncommon.    See  Todd  Perry  and  Marc  Zenner,  CEO 
Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 123, 124 (2000).  Perry and Zenner point out, however, that companies may avoid repricing because 
it might be embarrassing when publicly disclosed, but that they achieve much the same effect by issuing 
new options at a lower strike price (“reloading”).  Id. at 141.
26 See Thomas & Martin, supra note 19 at 44.
Stock option compensation may lead managers to manipulate earnings or 
other  accounting  figures  so  as  to  insure  that  the  company  meets  or 
exceeds analysts' expectations and that the company's stock price rises.  
Executives holding options also have a tendency to avoid dividends and 
engage  in  share  repurchases.    This  raises  important  questions  about 
whether managers are running the company to increase the value of their 
stock  options  or to raise  the  value  of  the  common  stock  held by  the 
shareholders.– 14 –
highly profitable option strikes while the public shareholders were left holding the bag when the 
price fell.
The use of option repricing thus ensured that the stock option compensation would fail to 
meet its avowed purpose: giving managers a strong personal incentive to maximize the value of 
the assets under their control and hence the stock price for the benefit of the shareholders.  Even 
worse than repricing, however, was the incentive that stock option compensation created for 
managers to manipulate and falsify financial disclosures to raise the stock price to keep or put 
their options in the money.
Enron's deceptive accounting has received lots of attention because of its subtlety and 
scale.  The company’s unorthodox and dubious use of special purpose entities for more than 
securitizing specific corporate assets (a relatively common corporate financing technique
27) 
created a distorted picture of the corporation's financial condition.  This is just one example of 
how Enron managers kept the stock price floating on a column of hot air.
28  Enron also indulged 
27 A “special purpose entity” (SPE) is used in the process of asset securitization, which is a form 
of corporate debt financing designed to protect the whole range of the borrower's assets from the claims 
of the lenders in that financing, and confine potential liability to specified assets.  This is achieved by 
placing a pool of assets, such as commercial leases or consumer receivables, in a separate entity, the SPE.  
The lender who lends on the strength of the cash flow from that pool of assets has recourse only to those 
assets in the event of the default, not the other assets of the originator.  For detailed analysis, see Steven 
L. Schwarz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stanford J. Bus. L. & Fin. 133 (1994); Steven L. 
Schwarz, Structured Finance, A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization (3d ed. 2002).  For a 
concise  guide  to  the  legal  considerations  in  structuring  special  purpose  entities  to  ensure  that  the 
originator remains “bankruptcy remote,” see Steven L. Schwarz, Structured Finance: The New Way to 
Securitize Assets, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 607, 621-26 (1990).
28 Indeed, Professor Schwarz has argued that Enron's use of SPEs was significantly different 
from that of normal asset securitization, and failed to provide the transfer of risk (and hence bankruptcy 
remoteness) that would prevent these highly risky transactions from burying Enron itself under the SPEs' 
liabilities in the event of default:
To  the  extent  securitization  is  used  to  keep  debt  off  a  company's  balance  sheet,  it 
superficially resembles Enron's use of SPEs.  But there are important differences because 
securitization, unlike the Enron-SPE transactions, unambiguously transfers risk from the – 15 –
in accounting practices very familiar to corporate CFOs, such as reporting revenues prematurely 
or speculatively, as the company did with risky derivative contracts that might not pay off in an 
indefinite future.  Critics of corporate accounting practices have identified a host of similar 
games that have been played to give a misleadingly positive picture of the corporation's financial 
condition in order to keep the stock price up and options in the money.  Some examples include 
adding fanciful items to revenue, treating a one-time payment from the sale of an asset or other 
windfall as if it were ongoing income, failing to record liabilities in whole or in part; treating 
ongoing liabilities as a special charge, and shifting current expenses or liabilities to a later 
period.  Some companies treated operating expenditures as capital expenditures, the cost of 
company to the SPE and its investors; and transfer of risk is central to the accounting 
determination of non-consolidation.  In Enron's SPE transactions, it was at least debatable 
whether risk was shifted on the hedged assets owned by Enron; although Enron had the 
right to require the SPEs to buy these assets at a pre-determined price should their values 
fall, that right was precarious because the SPEs were capitalized solely with Enron stock.  
Thus, when Enron's asset and stock values simultaneously fell, the SPEs were unable to 
perform their hedges.  In contrast, a company originating a securitization transaction 
transfers actual risk by selling financial assets – including the risk of non-payment or 
delayed payment associated with such assets – to the SPE.
Steven L. Schwarz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structure, 70 
U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1309, 1315-16 (2002).
Professor  Schwarz  also  points  out  that  the  allocation  of  risk  in  conventional  SPE  asset 
securitization is fully disclosed so that lenders can assess their loan risk and investors in the originating 
company can assess the significance of the SPE for the value of the originator's equity securities.  In 
Enron, disclosure about the SPEs was either intentionally minimized to hide the conflicts of interest that 
pervaded their SPE arrangements (a case of fraud), or, more fundamentally,
Enron's structured finance transactions were so complex that disclosure is necessarily 
imperfect - either oversimplifying the transactions or providing detail and sophistication 
beyond the level of an ordinary investor in Enron's securities.
Id. at 8.  In either case, the Enron SPE disclosures (or non-disclosures) deeply impaired the market's 
ability to assess Enron's financial condition.– 16 –
which can be spread over years, rather than reflected in the current period.
29  The temptation to 
use such chicanery to maintain the stock price was exacerbated during the market bubble, when 
soaring stock prices and price-earnings multiples imposed tremendous pressure on managers to 
keep up with the market at all costs.  The perceived pressure from Wall Street to report positive 
earnings to sustain the market price was, for some companies such as HealthSouth, Xerox and 
WorldCom, so irresistible that the financial misrepresentations were not even subtle.
30
29 For a survey of these and other accounting tricks, see Howard Schilit, Financial Shenanigans: 
How to Detect Accounting Gimmicks and Fraud in Financial Statements 63-175 (1993) (describing the 
“seven shenanigans” of corporate accounting).  For a discussion of how easily pro forma accounting, in 
particular, can be manipulated to produce such results, see Elliott & Schroth, supra note 11, at 37-42.  For 
an example of how one company used several of these devices, see In re Arthur Andersen LLP, Exchange 
Act Release No. AE–1405, June 19, 2001, 2001 WL 687561; SEC v. Arthur Anderson LLP, Exchange 
Act Release No. AE 1410, June 19, 2001, 2001 WL 687562 (pre-Enron case in which Waste Management 
used improper capitalization of expenses, a failure to amortize and improper reserve techniques).  See 
also Xerox's inappropriate acceleration of revenues from long-term equipment leases.  Mark Maremont, 
Xerox Overstated Pretax Income by $1.41 Billion, Filing Reveals, Wall St. J., July 1, 2002, at A3.
30 A particularly egregious example of this kind of blatant and relatively straightforward lying 
that came to light after Enron was that of HealthSouth Corp.  Beginning in 1997, HealthSouth executives 
began to be concerned about the gap between HealthSouth's actual earnings per share and Wall Street's 
earnings'  expectations.    According  to  the  criminal  information  filed  by  federal  prosecutors  against 
company executives, the defendants regularly used various accounting devices to overstate (in 2002) the 
company's cash by $300 million and total assets by $1.5 billion.  The former CFO has pled guilty to those 
charges.  See Former CFO of HealthSouth to Plead Guilty to Fraud; SEC Sues Over $1.4 Billion Scam, 
35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 504 (2004).
Xerox similarly overstated its profits by $1.4 billion over four years, a period during which senior 
executives gained millions by selling Xerox shares and being paid bonuses for meeting profit targets.  See 
Floyd Norris, 6 Former Xerox Executives to Pay $22 Million, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2003, at C1.
A special report commissioned by WorldCom and prepared by Wilmer Cutler & Pickering 
showed that WorldCom made repeated efforts to boost revenue to meet Wall Street expectations through 
an exercise called “Close the Gap.”  The company apparently recorded revenues from transactions that 
had not yet been approved, and reported revenue from one-time transactions while telling investors no 
such revenue had been included.  The report alleges that the CEO, Wolfgang Ebbers, was directly 
involved in these activities.  See Rebecca Blumenstein & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Report Finds Ebbers 
Played Role in Inflating Revenue, Wall St. J., June 6, 2003, at A1.– 17 –
All of these accounting tricks were available to corporate managers eager to keep their 
options not just profitable, but extraordinarily profitable.  The possibility of not just wealth, but 
immense wealth for the average CEO or senior executive created an ongoing moral hazard, an 
Alice-in-Wonderland universe in which debt disappeared mysteriously, revenue popped up out 
of rabbit holes, stock prices possessed only a theoretical relationship to earnings, financial 
statements could say whatever management wanted them to say, and lordly compensation came 
to feel like an entitlement.  Perhaps the perspective of hindsight lends too much of an air of 
inevitability to the malign effects of the stock option compensation practices of the 1990s, but it 
seems that options had an enormous influence on the kinds of accounting and disclosure 
practices which led so many investors, and the market in general, to overvalue so many 
companies.
These practices also led, some would argue, to a problem even more fundamental than 
inadequate disclosure.  The argument is similar to the one frequently heard in the 1980s during 
the heyday of hostile corporate takeovers, to the effect that an obsession with maintaining the 
stock price at a high level (to forestall tender offers at a premium) leads to short-term planning 
and decision-making, to the long-term detriment of the corporation.  Here, the argument would 
be that over-reliance on stock option compensation also has led to an equally unhealthy 
preoccupation with short-term maintenance of stock prices.
31  A possible response to both of 
these arguments might be that if the firm really was sacrificing the long-term interests of the 
corporation for short-term benefits in an unjustifiable way, the market would recognize that fact, 
and discount the price of the firm's securities appropriately.  This answer presumes, however, 
31 For  critical  discussion  of  the  impact  of  an  excessively  short-term  focus  on  earnings  in 
corporate America, see Mitchell supra n. 18. at 116-19.– 18 –
that the market has sufficient information about the firm to make such a discount, certainly a 
questionable presumption these days.  An additional problem is whether the market is 
sufficiently efficient to process the information rationally, a questionable presumption in light of 
the insights of behavioral finance into market behavior.  There is at least an important question 
as to whether the widespread use of very substantial stock option compensation has created a 
short-term bias that needs to be explored.  Whether the experience of the last couple of years will 
lead to significant changes in both compensation and accounting practices relating to stock 
option compensation remains to be seen.
32
32 There is some evidence of a shift from the use of stock options as incentive compensation to 
the use of restricted shares and so-called “performance” shares.  Restricted shares do not have to be set 
against earnings and do not dilute common shares, and not as many have to be issued as with options.  
They convert to full shares after a 3-5 year period and, unlike options, retain some value even if the stock 
price falls.  Performance shares are granted only when specified performance goals are met.  See Robert 
D. Hof, Stock Options Aren't the Only Option, Bus. Week, April 14, 2003, at 60.
Professor Brian Hall has argued that compensation in the form of stock as opposed to stock 
options is preferable for several reasons:
The problem isn't that stock options don't have any downside risk. The 
problem is that they have so much. They have value when granted and 
can fall out of the money very quickly and end up worth nothing. Then 
boards feel pressure to either reprice them or give additional grants to 
make up the difference–practices we all hate, for good reasons. Stock is 
much  less  fragile–it  never  falls  under  water  and  creates  no  repricing 
pressures.  Stock  is  also  more  transparent  to  shareholders  and  to  the 
board,  which  helps  them  make  better  decisions.  Stock  is  also  more 
understandable to a lot of executives. There's no need to rely on a highly 
complex model to understand its value. Accounting rules have skewed 
compensation awards in favor of options for far too long. Once we start 
treating options as a real expense, we're going to see a lot more stock and 
a lot fewer options.
Charles  Elson  (moderator),  Roundtable:  What's  Wrong  With  Executive  Compensation?,  Harvard 
Business Review, Jan. 2003, at 69, 73.
The accounting question is whether companies will voluntarily choose or will be required to 
deduct  the  value  of  stock  options  from  earnings.    In  the  summer  of  2002,  the  Coca-Cola  Company 
announced that it would voluntarily treat management stock options as an expense.  See Floyd Norris & 
Sherri Day, Coke to Report Stock Options as an Expense, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2002, at A1.  A major – 19 –
B.  The Failure of Gatekeepers
Market discipline and legal obligations are not the only constraints on the self-serving 
and deceptive behavior of corporate managers.  Independent professionals also function as 
gatekeepers, performing functions that help ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information 
disseminated by the firm into the marketplace.  The failures of auditors and securities analysts to 
perform those functions with respect to Enron and its progeny is by now well known, and has led 
to the destruction of one of the world's largest accounting firms and a massive legal settlement 
by some of the leading securities firms.
The auditing profession owes its status as a profession to the requirement of the federal 
securities laws, beginning in 1933, that issuers of securities provide financial statements certified 
by independent auditors.  The new legal requirement of independence gave auditors leverage 
against domination by their corporate clients, and the ability to make disinterested decisions and 
reach conclusions on the basis of their expert knowledge of generally accepted accounting 
shift in this direction would have a significant impact on the calculation of corporate earnings.  It has been 
estimated that if companies treated options as a cost, “the earnings per share of the companies in the 
Standard & Poors 500 stock index would have been 20 percent lower in 2001 than they actually were....”  
Devid Leonhardt, Options Calculus: Who Gets it Right?, N.Y. Times, March 30, 2003, Section 3 at 1.  As 
companies have begun voluntarily to expense stock option costs, furthermore, controversy has arisen over 
the proper methodology for calculating the cost that should be reported.  Id.
As of this writing in the Summer of 2003, the question of whether companies will be required to 
expense the value of stock option compensation remains.  The Federal Accounting Standards Board 
backed off from adopting such a requirement in the mid-1990s (see note 20 supra), but on March 12, 2003 
announced a study of accounting for stock options, expected to be completed by March 2004, which will 
address the issue.  See FASB Votes to Start Major Project on Accounting for Stock Compensation, 25 
Se c. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 463 (March 17, 2003).  For a summary of the current debate over the 
desirability of and appropriate methodology for expensing options, see Witnesses at House Hearing on 
Options Disagree at Every Turn on Expensing Options, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), June 9, 2003, at 35.– 20 –
principles and auditing standards.
33 The purpose of the legislative mandate for auditor 
independence was to provide an external check on the quality of financial disclosure by 
management.  The presumption, naturally, was that auditors would, in fact, act independently.  
Auditors were given a significant incentive to do so through the establishment of liability for 
them under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  The apparent failure of 
Arthur Anderson in the Enron case to act as any kind of real check on management's approach to 
financial accounting, and, rather, to facilitate misleading financial disclosures,
34 suggests that 
other incentives can overwhelm the auditors' incentives to act independently.
The other incentive cited most frequently has been accounting firms' interest in obtaining 
consulting work from companies they are auditing.  In at least some cases, the consulting work is 
more lucrative than auditing work, creating an incentive for the firm to be compliant with or 
even facilitative of the clients' desire to stretch or even exceed the boundaries of generally 
accepted accounting principles or auditing standards.  Recognition of that clash of incentives has 
33 See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation 188-92 (1984), which describes how the 
mutually beneficial relationship of federal securities regulation and the accounting profession evolved, 
and how it fostered the independence, reputation and growth of the profession.
34 The extent of Arthur Andersen's failure is by now well-established.  See Financial Oversight 
Report, supra note 8, at 28 (“One of the major concerns about Andersen as the auditor of Enron has been 
that it did not exhibit sufficient independence and objectivity in discharging its responsibilities.... Enron's 
auditor  failed  to  discharge  its  role  of  verifying  the  accuracy  of  Enron's  books.”)    A  committee  of 
independent  directors  of  Enron  also  concluded  that  “Andersen  did  not  fulfill  its  professional 
responsibilities in connection with its audit of Enron's financial statements....”  Powers Report, supra note 
11, at 24. See also Bratton, supra note 6, at ___ (Enron's auditors “manifestly should have refused to give 
a favorable opinion on Enron's financials....It is clear that Enron had captured its auditor, denuding the 
relationship of its necessary adversary aspect.”)  For discussion of the actual accounting violations, see id. 
at 63-68.  Professor Bratton points out that in most cases either Enron or Andersen, or both, simply failed 
to follow the existing rules.  Bratton, supra note 6, at ___.  In other cases, the rules were followed, but the 
rules were defective substantively and need reconsideration.  See also Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, 
Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30 2002, at C1, C6 (citing the need to develop 
more effective rules).– 21 –
drawn considerable attention,
35 resulting in changes in law and practice designed to mitigate the 
conflict.
36  Most problematic, however, is the possibility that the culture of auditing may have 
changed even without reference to the desire to generate or preserve consulting business.
37  One 
of the indirect effects of over-reliance on stock option compensation may have been the 
35 See, e.g., Financial Oversight Report, supra note 8, at 28 (“In 2000, Andersen earned $52 
million in fees from Enron.  Less than half that amount, $25 million, was for audit work; $27 million 
related to consulting services....[I]t is difficult to comprehend how such large consulting fees could not 
have created a serious conflict of interest for Enron.”)
36 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §201(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j-l(g)-(h) (2002) sets out a new list of non-audit 
services that auditors are proscribed from providing.  The SEC adopted rules effective May 6, 2003 
implementing those proscriptions, including a prohibition on financial information systems design and 
implementation services; a prohibition on internal audit outsourcing services; and a restriction on certain 
types of “expert” services. SEC Rel. No. 33-8183 (Mar. 31, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6010. Note, 
however, that an auditor may still provide financial information system design and implementation, as 
well as internal outsourcing services, if it is reasonable to conclude that the results of the service will not 
be subject to audit procedures during an audit of the client's financial statements. Id. at 6011. The new 
rules also create a requirement for pre-approval of audit and non-audit services to be provided by the 
auditor. Id. at 6010. These measures fall far short of the full severance of auditing and non-auditing 
services some thought to be necessary.  See, e.g., Special Report, Accounting in Crisis, Bus. Week, Jan. 
28, 2002, at 44, 46 (urging a bar on consulting services to audit clients).  Note, however, that all of the 
Big Five accounting firms have placed their own restrictions on the sale of consulting services to their 
clients, particularly internal audit services.  See Jonathan D. Glater, Deloitte Is Last Big Audit Firm to 
Revamp Consulting Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2002, at C1.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also added new requirements for rotation of audit partners after five 
years (§203), selection of auditors by board audit committees (§202), more detailed reporting by auditors 
to boards (§206), and the presence of a “financial expert” on the audit committee (§§204,407).
37 For an argument by the former head of the ethics consulting unit at Arthur Andersen that a 
firm once renowned for its revenue became so obsessed with generating revenue and internal competition 
over fees that it abandoned its own ethical principles, see Barbara Ley Toffler with Jennifer Reingold, 
Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Anderson (2003).  For discussion of how 
Anderson became complicit with the fraud being perpetrated by the corporation's executives, with respect 
to whom they became “part of the family,” see Elliott & Schroth, supra note 11, 89-99 (2003), and of how 
they accepted Enron executives' spurious materiality arguments regarding earnings overstatements, see 
Noam Scheiber, Peer Revue, New Republic, Jan. 28, 2002, at 19, 20.
Recognition of the sins of Andersen, however, should not preclude recognizing the many failures 
of a similar type by other large accounting firms.  See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Ernst Partners Accept Limits on 
Audits,  N.Y.  Times,  Apr.  25,  2003,  at  C1  (describing  settlement  of  SEC  allegations  that  auditors 
approved the financial statements of CUC International when they knew that they did not conform to 
GAAP).– 22 –
corruption of the auditing function, as auditors faced extraordinary pressure from managers to 
approve questionable treatments of earnings and debt to sustain the stock price.  When this took 
place during a stock market boom in which rising prices covered all sins, the risk of liability may 
have seemed slim to auditors eager to preserve positive relationships with managers, repeat 
business and a reputation for being “reasonable.”  This attitude resulted in a tendency to go 
along, rather than to resist managers insisting on questionable accounting treatment and financial 
disclosures.  There was also a conflict between a firm's interest in maintaining its reputation for 
auditing integrity and individual partners' desires to maximize their income within the firm, 
when a partner's income is heavily dependent on billings from one client.
38  Whatever the reason, 
it seems clear that auditors were frail obstacles, at best, to the degradation of financial disclosure 
that became epidemic in the scandals of 2002.
The impact of conflicts of interests seems even more obvious in the case of securities 
analysts.  A major settlement initiated by the New York State Attorney General involving several 
major securities firms was the response to the practice of touting stocks of companies with whom 
the analysts' firms had a significant investment banking relationship, regardless of the analysts' 
negative view of those issuers.  The practice of tying analysts' compensation to revenues 
generated by investment banking business significantly distorted analysts' incentives to provide 
disinterested, critical reports on the issuers they were evaluating, and induced them to delude the 
investing public with essentially false analyses.
Once again a conflict of interest undermined an incentive to act independently of the 
issuer of securities.  Securities analysts, theoretically, have a strong incentive to provide accurate 
38 See Ribstein, supra note 16, 28 J. Corp. L. at 13-14.  Ribstein also considers the possibility 
that the auditor may be afflicted in those circumstances by a “self-serving bias” that prevents recognition 
of problems, rather than affirmative dishonesty. Id.– 23 –
information and advice.  If what they offer is deemed unreliable, presumably its market value 
will diminish.  This dynamic alone should have been sufficient to ensure analysts' probity, 
especially when the incentive was protected from erosion by the supposed wall between the 
analysis and investment banking functions in their firms.  Apparently, the incentives created by 
the prevailing compensation system were sufficient in many cases to render the incentive to tell 
the truth less powerful than it should have been.
39
The failures of auditors and securities analysts as gatekeepers are notorious.  Relatively 
less attention has been paid, however, to the lawyers and law firms who advised the fallen 
corporations.  To be sure, some of those lawyers have come in for their share of scrutiny and 
criticism, and some are enmeshed as defendants in civil litigation brought on behalf of 
shareholders.  Bolstering the role of lawyers in forestalling corporate law-breaking also has 
39 In response to this problem, on February 2, 2003 the SEC adopted Regulation AC , 17 C.F.R. 
242, which requires research reports to contain certifications by the research analyst that: (i) the views 
expressed in the report accurately reflect the analyst's personal views; and (ii) the analyst did or did not, 
as  the  case  may  be,  receive  compensation  or  other  payments  in  connection  with  the  analyst's 
recommendations or views.  SEC Rels. No. 33-8193, 34-47384 60 Fed. Reg. 9482.  Note, however, that 
Regulation AC does not impose substantive requirements on research analyst's regarding the content of 
their research reports or their manner of compensation.  The new rules thus fall short of mandating the 
separation of research and investment banking function.
A major enforcement action spearheaded by the Office of the Attorney General of the State of 
New York and joined by the SEC and other regulators, however, led to a settlement in 2003 with ten 
major securities firms that not only extracted in excess of $1.4 billion from those firms, but required those 
firms to substantially sever the links between research and investment banking, particularly with respect 
to analysts' compensation.  See Joint Press Release of the SEC, the State of New York Attorney General, 
NASAA, the NASD and, the NYSE, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions 
Involving  Conflicts  of  Interest  Between  Research  and  Investment  Banking  (April  28,  2003) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm;  SEC,  Statement  Regarding  Global  Settlement  Related  to 
Analyst  Conflict  of  Interest  (April  28,  2003)  http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm.    For 
discussion and comments, see Stephen Labaton, 10 Wall St. Firms Settle With U.S. in Analyst Inquiry, 
N.Y. Times, April 29, 2003, at A1.
It is likely that the parties to this settlement will also face private claims from investors.  For an 
argument that analysts' undisclosed conflicts of interest should give rise to liability for securities fraud, 
see Jill  I.  Gross,  Securities  Analysts'  Undisclosed  Conflicts  of  Interest:  Unfair  Dealing  or  Securities 
Fraud?,  2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 631.– 24 –
become the focus of federal legislation.
40 But lawyers do not seem to have figured in the same 
relatively simple morality plays as the auditors and the securities analysts.  While their behavior 
has raised serious questions, the answers to those questions about lawyers are not transparently 
obvious.  This is because the lawyers' roles were more complex and ambiguous.
Auditors' roles, when boiled down to their essence, are straightforward.  They must play a 
quasi-adversarial role versus their auditing clients.  Their job is not to help the managers of the 
company achieve their goals.  The auditors' responsibility is to protect the investing public by 
casting a dispassionate, disinterested eye on management's accounting and financial disclosures 
and placing their own reputation on the line by certifying the corporate financial statement. They 
function, in essence, as reputational intermediaries, drawing on their professional reputations to 
vouch for their auditing client's financial disclosures.
41 Similarly, the securities analyst's job is to 
pierce through the appearance projected by the corporation and to be the one who says that “The 
emperor has no clothes!” Their relationship to the issuer of securities must be more detached 
than that of the auditor, and their responsibility flows not to corporate management but to those 
members of the investing public who rely on their analysis.  To the extent that conflicts of 
interest led auditors and analysts to place currying favor with corporate managers ahead of their 
clear obligations to investors, they failed their essential tasks.  In other words, to the extent they 
became advocates, they failed as auditors and analysts.
That, of course, is the basic difference between the auditor’s roles and the role of lawyers 
that makes lawyers' participation in the perfect storm of systems failures more ambiguous, and 
40 See text accompanying notes 98-108 infra.
41 See Ribstein, supra note 18, 28 J. Corp. L. at 13, regarding the auditing firm's incentive not to 
forfeit their “reputational bonds.”– 25 –
not the subject of a simple morality tale.  Lawyers are advocates.  They have obligations to act 
on behalf of the corporate client that makes their role quite different from the quasi-adversarial 
role of an auditor and entirely different from the detached, arms-length function of a securities 
analyst.
42  Because auditors and analysts are not advocates for the corporation, their decision to 
act as if they were advocates amounted to a betrayal of the public interests they were supposed to 
serve.  It cannot be said that the lawyers in Enron and the other cases, who were in fact supposed 
to be advocates for their corporate clients, similarly betrayed a public interest simply by virtue of 
acting on behalf of their clients.  That conclusion, however, does not end the analysis.  
Assumption of the obligations of advocacy does not excuse a lawyer from other obligations.
Lawyers acting in the context of public companies are not only advocates.  They are also 
gatekeepers.  They stand at the approaches to the capital markets.  As the auditor constrains 
access to the markets by its power to certify financial statements, and the analyst by its power to 
make investment recommendations, the company's lawyer has the duty, and at least some power, 
to constrain unlawful behavior by the company as it seeks access to capital.  The lawyer can 
control market access by withholding cooperation from the potential wrongdoer.
43 She can refuse 
to do necessary legal work, provide legal opinions or otherwise refuse to associate the law firm's 
name with the questionable transaction.  This will make it difficult for the client to complete the 
mechanics of the transaction; the lawyer's refusal to vouch for the client by acting as a 
42 For an example of how an analyst completely lost his detachment from the company he 
researched, see Landon Thomas, Jr., Ex-Analyst Was Too Close to Tyco, N.A.S.D. Says, N.Y. Times, 
May 29, 2003, at C1 (Merrill Lynch analyst “went so far at to refer to himself as a loyal Tyco employee 
and joked that he was indirectly paid by the company”).
43 See  generally  works  by  Professor  Reinier  Kraakman  elaborating  this  definition  of 
“gatekeeper.”  Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of Third Party Enforcement Strategy, J.L. 
Econ. Org. 53 (1986); Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 
(1984).– 26 –
reputational intermediary will make the transaction less valuable to third parties or less likely to 
be approved by other professional gatekeepers, higher level corporate decisionmakers or 
regulators.
44   In addition, a lawyer can act as a gatekeeper more affirmatively by blowing the 
whistle, reporting the problem to a higher level within the corporate entity or externally to 
regulators such as the SEC.  In many respects, the lawyer-as-gatekeeper in a corporate/securities 
context has to maintain the type of “healthy skepticism”
45 toward management that should also 
be characteristic of the auditor.  The lawyer thus has both an obligation to the client and a public 
obligation.
Here is where the complexity lies.  Lawyers are both advocates and gatekeepers, with 
obligations running both to the client (of a very specific kind) and to the public (of a more 
indeterminate type).  Their relationship with the client is thus both one of trust and confidence 
and one that can be adversarial.  This duality can produce conflict within the attorney-client 
relationship, and multiplies the opportunity for failure.  Section 307 and the implementing rules 
reflect the apparent belief that the existing rules governing the attorney-client relationship made 
it more likely that lawyers would fail as gatekeepers by not imposing upon them the 
responsibility to report, in some way, unlawful behavior they confronted in the course of their 
representation.  By creating more robust whistleblowing obligations for lawyers, the section 307 
44 With respect to the concept of gatekeeper as “reputational intermediary,” see Ronald Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 612-21 (1984).
45 For an authoritative statement of this obligation by a leading securities practitioner, see A.A. 
Sommer,  Jr.,  The  Emerging  Responsibilities  of  the  Securities  Lawyer,  Address  to  the  Banking, 
Corporation & Business Law Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n (January 24, 1974), reprinted in Larry D. 
Soderquist & Theresa Gabaldon, Securities Regulation 617-619 (4
th ed. 1999).  For a similar statement by 
two of the leading securities law academics in an authoritative treatise, see Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1384 (4
th ed. 2001) (the securities lawyer should ask “searching 
questions” about the client's disclosures).– 27 –
rules attempt to fortify lawyers' positions as gatekeepers.  This legislative and regulatory 
response, however, presumes that the problem in Enron and the other cases was primarily one of 
insufficient incentives (or legal obligations) to blow the whistle.
That is a questionable presumption.  If we look more closely at these cases, we may 
conclude that lawyers' contributions to the debacles had less to do with the failures as 
whistleblowers, but with different, and more fundamental problems to which the section 307 
rules do not really respond.  If we can understand more precisely how lawyers failed in these 
cases we can then determine whether the legal response to the perceived failures of corporate 
lawyering embodied in section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC rules makes sense.
II. HOW DID THE LAWYERS FAIL?
Lawyers can be said to have contributed to the perfect storm in at least three basic ways.  
First, in some cases, they acted as partners in crime with the malefactors in the executive suite 
and on the board.  Second, in others they provided legitimate advice on legal transactions that 
turned out to have very bad consequences.  Third, in yet other cases, they were “merely” 
negligent, failing in their basic obligation to their clients to provide competent legal advice.  In 
considering these three different scenarios, the question should be asked whether the presence of 
a more robust whistleblowing obligation would have made a material difference.
A.  Partners in Crime
There apparently were situations in the recent cases where lawyers actively and 
intentionally participated in the wrongdoing perpetrated by corporate managers.  Those lawyers 
apparently knew that managers were deliberately falsifying disclosures, deceiving the board of 
directors, regulatory agencies or the investing public, misappropriating assets of the corporation 
or otherwise illegally self-dealing.  These lawyers knowingly facilitated the managers' efforts – 28 –
through the use of their legal expertise in order to benefit themselves.  In other words, some 
lawyers may have chosen to be partners in crime.  Given the complexities of the corporate and 
securities laws, such active connivance by lawyers played a big role in helping corporate 
managers achieve illicit ends.  An example in point may be the general counsel of Tyco 
International Ltd., who was criminally indicted for allegedly covering up a conflict-of-interest 
transactions benefiting the chief executive officer and taking for himself an unauthorized $14 
million “loan.”
46 Another example may be that of the general counsel of an Enron subsidiary 
who, according to the SEC, directly participated in and benefited from investments in the conflict 
of interest transactions with affiliates created by Enron.
47 We may also include in this category 
situations in which there was a less direct, but equally real benefit to the lawyers involved.  The 
best example is the legal advice, drafting services, and “true sale” opinions delivered by Vinson 
& Elkins in connection with the special purpose entities created by Enron executives.
48 Vinson & 
46 Otis Bilodeau, After Tyco, the Role of GCS is Under Scrutiny, The Recorder, Sept. 26, 2002 
at 3; Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyer Caught in Tyco Tangle Leaves Friends Wondering, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
24, 2002, at C1.  As of this writing the prosecution against Mark Belnick, the former general counsel of 
Tyco, remains unresolved.  For a more detailed discussion of Belnick's actions and the SEC's allegations 
against him, see Laurie P. Cohen, How A Tyco Lawyer Channeled Windfall Into Unlikely Cause, Wall 
St. J., June 4, 2003, at A1.
47 Miriam Rozen, Allegations Swirl Around Former Enron In-houser, Tex. Law., Feb. 4, 2002 at 
21.
48 Vinson & Elkins' involvement in the construction of Enron special purpose entities has given 
rise to the claim that the firm is primarily liable for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §7245.  See Newby v. Enron Corporation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 656-69 
(S.D. Tex. 2002).  The plaintiff's claim is that the law firm's level of participation in the transactions and 
knowledge of fraudulent conduct was so extensive that it amounted to much more than mere aiding and 
abetting, for which there is no private cause of action for liability.  Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).  The complaint alleges that “Vinson & Elkins was not 
merely  a  drafter,  but  essentially  a  co-author  of  the  documents  it  created  for  public  consumption, 
concealing its own and other participants' actions.”  Newby, supra at 704.  This was but one of the 
allegations in the complaint:– 29 –
Elkins’ participation was a crucial element in the execution of transactions with officers that 
involved massive conflicts of interest and inadequate public disclosures and which the law firm 
allegedly knew were fraudulent.  The law firm did not invest directly in the transactions, but its 
participation helped preserve its lucrative relationship with the key officers of one of its largest 
clients.
49 Purposefully facilitating transactions harmful to the corporation and investors (and 
Among the complaint's [other] specific allegations of acts in furtherance 
of the [deceptive] scheme are that the firm's involvement in negotiation
and structuring of the illicit partnerships and off-the-books SPEs, whose 
formation  documentation it  drafted,  as  well  as that of  the subsequent 
transactions  of  these  entities.    It  advised  making  Kopper  manager  of 
Chewco so that Enron's involvement in and control of the SPE would not 
have  to  be  disclosed,  drafted  'true  sales'  opinions  that  Lead  Plaintiff 
asserts  were  essential  to  effect  many  of  the  allegedly  fraudulent 
transactions.    Vinson  &  Elkins  was  materially  involved  in  the  New 
Power IPO, and it structured and provided advice on the Mahonia trades, 
all actions constituting primary violations of §10(b).  In other words, it 
'effected the very' deceptive devices and contrivances that were the heart 
of the alleged Ponzi scheme.
Id. at 705.  The court found in Newby that the forgoing allegations (and others) stated a claim under 
§10(b), and denied Vinson & Elkins' motion to dismiss.  Id. at 705.  For discussion of how the assertion 
of primary liability under §10(b) was designed as an alternative to the aiding-and-abetting argument 
eliminated by Central Bank, see David E. Rovella, Milberg Guns for Enron's Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., April 
15,  2002,  at  A1.    Vinson  &  Elkins  has  denied that  its involvement  in  the  questionable transactions 
amounted to legal malpractice, let alone fraud.  See Vinson & Elkins Shoots Back, Legal Times, Feb. 11, 
2002, at 17 (emphasizing lack of knowledge of any fraudulent conduct and lack of responsibility for 
accounting determinations).  Others have also defended the firm, arguing that “the issues surrounding the 
Enron work turned on judgment calls based on incomplete information” rather than “obvious fraud,” John 
Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Lawyers, N.Y. Times, March 12, 2002 at C1.
While the factual issues in Newby remain to be resolved, the allegations, if true, would show that 
the firm went beyond “mere” malpractice, and truly became a “partner in crime” with its client.
49 Enron was Vinson & Elkins' top client, accounting for more than 7% of the firm's $450 
million in annual revenue.  One Client, Big Hassle, Bus. Week, Jan 28, 2002, at 38.  The plaintiffs in 
Newby alleged that “Vinson & Elkins chose to engage in illegal activity for and with its client in return 
for lucrative fees.” Newby, supra note 48, at 298.– 30 –
preparing misleading disclosures about them)
50 to protect an advantageous relationship with 
corporate officers crosses the line of mere negligence.  A lawyer who does that becomes a 
partner-in-crime, and may become liable as a primary violator, and not simply as aider and 
abettor of client wrongdoing.  Whether that actually happened in the case of Vinson & Elkins 
and Enron remains to be seen as the facts are developed in litigation.  To the extent that it 
happened, however, it is truly bad.
It is bad, naturally, because no one wants to see lawyers, especially those whose actions 
affect hundreds of millions of dollars of wealth, deliberately engaged in illegality or criminality, 
particularly when such behavior benefits the lawyer, directly or indirectly.  We would find it 
instructive to ask why such behavior surfaced in elite law firms and general counsels' offices 
where, theoretically, there are significant internal and external incentives and restraints that 
should preclude such a thing.  This is the type of question we ask about white collar crime in 
general, of which this is a specific example.
But, important as such questions may be, the kind of behavior I have just described does 
not raise novel or even interesting questions about the nature of the lawyers' role or the 
relationship of a lawyers' obligations to the client and her duty to the public.  No one would 
50 For criticism of Vinson & Elkins' advice regarding the disclosures made by Enron about its 
SPEs, see the Powers Report, supra note 10 at 26 (“Vinson & Elkins should have brought a stronger, 
more objective and critical voice to the disclosure process.”).  See also id. at 178-203 for specific and 
highly critical discussion of Vinson & Elkins' role in preparing public disclosures about insiders' interests 
in Enron's related-party transactions.  The Report concluded that “the responsibility for these inadequate 
disclosures is shared by Enron Management, the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Board, Enron's 
in-house counsel, Vinson & Elkins, and Andersen.”  Id. at 178.
Even more serious charges of active complicity in generating misleading financial disclosures led 
to indictment of the former general counsel of HBO & Co., who allegedly helped design and execute an 
elaborate plan to increase revenue artificially by as much as 500 percent prior to the company's merger 
with McKesson Corp.  The Justice Department called this its first-ever securities fraud indictment of a 
general counsel.  Jason Hoppin, Corporate GC Indicted in Fraud Case, Leg. Intelligencer (Phila.), June 6, 
2003, at 4.– 31 –
suggest that a lawyer knowingly and affirmatively furthering a fraudulent or otherwise illegal 
scheme is doing anything consistent with a professional obligation to a client.  The decision of a 
lawyer to share in a client's illegality or criminality does not suggest that there is anything wrong 
with the rules of professional conduct, or that there is a structural problem in the rules governing 
representation of a public corporation.  Such a decision does not involve a question of what the 
law permits or requires (which should be clear), but of why a lawyer chooses to disobey the law.  
In short, to the extent the scandals are about lawyers' purposely furthering their clients' 
wrongdoing we have a problem not of law, but of morality or psychology or the sociology of the 
profession.  This problem is certainly important to explore, but it is not necessarily a problem of 
whistleblowing.  If a lawyer has decided to be partners-in-crime, a legal obligation to blow the 
whistle is the least of his concerns.  He has already crossed a crucial line, and is not likely to 
inform on himself.
B.  Legal Transactions, Bad Consequences
The partners-in-crime scenario should seem relatively clear.  A second scenario is based 
not on the assumption that some lawyers were participating in anything illegal, but that they were 
engaged in structuring transactions that were entirely legal, but which ultimately had bad 
consequences.  Was the lawyer's participation in structuring those transactions, which 
presumably needed expert legal advice, somehow problematic?
There are many examples of such “legal” transactions that produced, singly or 
cumulatively, bad effects.  One of the bitterest consequences of the Enron collapse was the 
destruction of most of the value in ordinary employees' 401(k) plans, which were concentrated in – 32 –
Enron stock.
51 Exacerbating this problem was the company’s policy of partially restricting 
employees from selling their own shares.
52 The employee benefits lawyers who permitted such 
concentration and restrictions, however, apparently provided correct legal advice.  Are they 
responsible for what may now appear to be the negative effects of overly-permissive legal rules, 
and of Enron executives' and trustees' administration of those rules to the detriment of their 
employees?
53 A similar question may be asked about the lawyers who set up the stock option 
51 At  Enron,  employees  concentrated  62%  of  their  assets  in  Enron  stock.    Jeremy  Kahn, 
Backlash:  When  401(k)s  Are  KO'd,  Fortune,  Jan.  7,  2002  at  104.    This  level  of  concentration  was 
relatively high; in October 2001 only 30% of the $71 billion invested in 1.5 million 401(k) plans was 
invested in the stock of the sponsoring company. Id. (citing report by Hewitt Associates.) Many financial 
experts believe, however, that even 25% concentration of assets in employer stock is too high, because 
most employees would benefit from greater diversification. See How Well Do 401(k) Plans Work, and 
Who Benefits Most From Them?, Knowledge @Wharton, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu (Winter 
2003). Such diversification, however, was not illegal. It was also not unique at the time. See Steven 
Greenhouse, Enron's Many Strands: Retirement Money, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2002, at C1 (quoting Senator 
Jon Corzine discussing similar examples of concentration at Sunbeam and Waste Management).
52 Enron  employees  were  prohibited  from  selling  stock  contributed  to  their  401(k)  by  the 
company  until  they  were  50  years  old.  See  Statement  of  Senator  Joseph  Lieberman  (Feb.  5,  2002) 
http://www.senate.gov/-lieberman/newsite/press/01101/2002102708.html,  at  2.  They  were  also 
prohibited from selling their stock during a controversial moratorium or “lock-down” period for at least 
two weeks while Enron was changing its outside administrator. Id. at 3.  Enron stock was exceptionally 
volatile during this period, and only senior executives faced no restrictions in selling their stock. Steven 
Greenhouse & Stephen Labaton, Enron Executies Say They Debated Freeze on Pension, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
6, 2002, at A1.
53 For critical discussion of Enron executives' promotion of employees' 401(k) investment in 
Enron stock, see Lieberman Statement, supra note 51 at 2 (“Enron's top management repeatedly promoted 
its stock through internal publications and communications, even when executives must have know the 
company was  a house of cards”). Enron executives have also been criticized for not delaying the lock-
down or “black-out” period when they knew that a prohibition on selling would exacerbate employees' 
losses.  Greenhouse & Labaton, supra note 51.  Both the Labor Department and private plaintiffs have 
initiated action against the 401(k) plan's trustees because of their failure to warn plan participants about 
serious problems with Enron's accounting and its impending financial crisis.  Steven Greenhouse, U.S. 
Pressing for Enron Plan Trustees to Step Down, Feb. 11, 2002.  See also Kathy Chen & Theo Francis, 
Enron  Official  Failed  to  Warn  Participants  of  401(k)  Plan,  Wall  St.  J.,  Feb.  6,  2002,  at  C1  (citing 
argument that trustees also should have stopped offering Enron stock as an investment option and using it 
as a matching contribution).  Whether managers of Enron or the 401(k) plan's trustees violated their 
fiduciary  duties  in  aggressively  pushing  investment  in  Enron  or  in  failing  to  disclose  material  risks 
remains to be seen.  The role of their lawyers in advising on their sales practices and disclosure policies 
also deserves to be explored.– 33 –
compensation plans that now seem to have created perverse incentives rather than an alignment 
of shareholder and managerial interests.
54
What about the lawyers who obtained exemptions for Enron from registration under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940
55 and the Public Utility Holding Company Act?
56 Registration 
under either act could have subjected Enron to a much higher level of regulatory scrutiny than it 
received under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
57  In fact, Enron's ability to fall between 
regulatory tools can be cited as one of the reasons it was able to conduct its business in such an 
54 See text accompanying notes 20-32 supra.
55 15 U.S.C. §80a-6. For discussion of the exemption order issued by the SEC, see Financial 
Oversight Report, supra note 9, at 57-60.  While finding that the “initial grant of the exemption itself . . . 
was not clearly erroneous and had some Congressional support,” id. at 60, the Report expressed concern 
with the SEC's lack of any means to monitor the continued appropriateness of the exemption.” Id.  For 
Enron's application for the exemption order, see Enron Corp., et al., Notice of Application for Exemption 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC File No. 812-10150, Rel. No. IC-22515 (Feb. 14, 
1997), 1997 SEC LEXIS 372.  For the SEC's order, see In the Matter of Enron Corp., et al., SEC file No. 
812-10150, Rel. No. IC-22560 (March 13, 1997), 1997 SEC LEXIS 571.
While the Report indicates that the correctness or wisdom of the SEC's decision to issue the 
exemption  order  may  be  debatable,  it  does  not  suggest  that  there  was  anything  inappropriate  about 
Enron's decision to apply for the order, the disclosures made in its application or the legal arguments 
made by its lawyers.  The lawyers involved thus seemed merely to have helped their client push the limits 
of  the  applicable  law,  but  not  do  anything  illegal.    This  is  an  excellent  example  of  how  “normal” 
lawyering within the boundaries of the law can produce bad consequences.
56 15 U.S.C. §79c. Over a period of ten years, Enron and/or its subsidiaries obtained exemptions 
under the Act or determinations by the SEC staff that the activities they intended to engage in would not 
bring them under the definition of “public utility holding company.”  Financial Oversight Report, supra 
note 9, at 48.  The Report does not find these exemptions to have been wrongfully granted, although it 
does take the agency to task for delaying action on pending applications, because the delay apparently 
allowed Enron to collect higher rates during the period of pendency than it would have been able to 
collect if the application had been acted upon quickly. Id. at 56-57.  It also criticizes the SEC for “the lack 
of coordination between the SEC and FERC [which] permitted Enron to take full advantage of gaps and 
overlaps in the agencies' jurisdictions.” Id. at 57.  Enron's lawyers thus seem to have been both creative 
and persistent in the typical lawyerly endeavor of exploiting the limitations of the various regulatory 
schemes applicable to their client.
57 15 U.S.C.A. ___.– 34 –
unusual, deceptive and risky manner.
58  Were the attorneys, who made the legal arguments that 
led to at least arguably correct, if ultimately unfortunate administrative decisions to exempt 
Enron from regulation, doing anything inappropriate?
The same thing might be asked about the lawyers who structured Enron's byzantine tax 
shelter transactions, creating tax issues so complex “that the IRS lacked the capacity to deal with 
them.”
59  These “structured” tax transactions were used not only to generate massive tax 
deductions, but also as a basis for reporting future tax savings as current income.
60  While the tax 
opinions from major law firms supporting those transactions, as well as the information disclosed 
to the IRS and the public about them, have been severely criticized,
61 can it be said definitively 
58 For critical discussion of the consequences of granting an exemption under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, see John Berlau, Who Cleared That Exemption? Insight (Wash. Times), March 4, 
2002, at 15; Stephen Labaton, Exemption Won in 1997 Set Stage for Enron Woes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
2002, at ___.  It should also be noted that Enron also was able to avoid regulation under the Commodities 
Future Trading Commission by supporting legislation exempting energy trading that was enacted in 2000.  
See Richard Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, Multiple Safeguards Failed to Detect Problems at Enron, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 20, 2002, at ___.
59 David Cay Johnston, Wall St. Firms Are Faulted in Report on Enron's Taxes, N.Y. Times, 
Fe b. 14, 2002, at ___.
60 For an excellent summary of the issues associated with Enron's tax transactions, see Mike 
France, The Rise of the Wall Street Tax Machine, Bus. Week, Mar. 31, 2003, at 84.  The key to these 
transactions was highly complex exchanges of assets between Enron and its  SPEs not only to generate 
future tax savings, but to convert those notional savings into current income.  France reports that “the 12 
tax avoidance transactions the company did from 1995 to 2001 produced $2.02 billion in tax savings –
and were then converted into $2.079 billion in current income.” Id. at 86.  France's data is derived from a 
report by the staff on the Joint Committee on Taxation.  Report of Investigational Enron Corporation and 
Related  Entities  Regarding  Federal  Tax  and  Compensation  Issues,  and  Policy  Recommendations, 
www.gpo.gov/congress/joint/jcs~3~03/vol1/index.html.
61 See  critical  comments  by  Professors  Susan  P.  Koniak,  Gregory  A.  Plesko  and  Jeffrey 
Gramlich quoted in Peter Behr & Carrie Johnson, Enron Probes Tax Deals, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 2002, at 
E01, and Professor Sheldon D. Pollack quoted in France, supra note 60, at 84.  These and other critics 
have not only questioned the legality of claiming deductions by both Enron and the SPE on the same 
transaction, and treating tax savings as current income, but also the quality of disclosure regarding those 
decisions.  Without full disclosure of the sleight-of-hand in such conversions, the statement of income is 
likely to give a misleading picture of the company's profitability.– 35 –
that the lawyers involved were doing anything more than helping the client minimize tax liability 
within the applicable rules?
62
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the opinions and advice provided by Enron's 
tax counsel were legitimate, in that they were not compromised by deceit, conflict of interest or 
even incompetence.  Does that mean that there is nothing left to say about what these lawyers 
did?
One can envision a theory of lawyering that requires lawyers to take a very long view of 
what the potential negative consequences of legal transactions might be for persons other than 
their clients, or for the public interest in the abstract.  Application of such a robust theory of 
A particularly troublesome aspect of the tax opinions provided in these transactions was the 
incestuous  relationship  among  the  law  firms  providing  the  opinions  and  the  investment  bankers  or 
accounting firms promoting the transactions to the clients.  The tax opinion is “likely compromised,” 
according to Professor Ronald Pearlman, when the person providing the opinion “is involved in selling 
the shelter, when that person is paid up front, and when that person's time and effort are involved in 
selling the shelter.”  Paul Braverman, The Bleeding Edge, Am. Law, June 2003, at 94, 97 (discussing 
criticism of the role of the law firm McKee Nelson Ernst & Young in shelter transactions).  These 
opinions raise a question of whether the lawyers were involved in ordinary transactional cost engineering 
and tax minimization (raising the “legal transaction, bad consequences” problem), or whether the lawyers 
were so compromised by conflicts of interest as to become “partners-in-crime.”  For discussion of the 
possible moral effects of providing opinions that play so close to the line, see text accompanying notes 
93-94 infra.
62 Crucial to the consummation of these transactions were opinion letters provided by major law 
firms such as King & Spalding and Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld on the legality of the tax treatment 
claimed for the transaction.  See France, supra note 59, at 84-85, 87.  Presumably, the attitude of the firms 
involved was summarized by Robert J. Hermann, former Enron in-house tax counsel, who said “People 
can disagree on what works within the written rules . . . If you know the rules, you don't have to break the 
rules, you just use them.  That's what lawyers and accountants do.”  Behr & Johnson, supra note 60, at 
E01.  While it may be that the legal opinions were legitimate means to achieving the legitimate goal of tax 
minimization, there is a question of whether it was possible for a firm to give an objective, independent 
opinion when it was involved in the development of the transaction.  France, supra note 60, at 87.  Akin 
Gump has responded to such a suggestion by asserting that it had the “informal consent” of both parties to 
the transaction.  Id.  For further discussion of the significance of client consent, see text accompanying 
note 87 infra.– 36 –
“green” lawyering, as it has been called in a provocative article by Professor David Luban,
63
could provide a response to the problem of “legal transactions, bad consequences,” which is 
something different from intentionally assisting clients perform unlawful acts (the “partners-in-
crime” scenario), and even willful blindness to those acts (which could be simply another version 
of the “partners-in-crime” scenario).
64  In both of these versions of the partners-in-crime scenario 
the lawyers' duty of non-cooperation should be obvious, although lawyers too frequently justify 
willful ignorance with highly dubious versions of the “I didn't know” excuse.
65   A truly “green” 
conception of lawyering, while it would certainly require avoidance of “partners-in-crime” 
behavior,
66 would go further by requiring a lawyer advising or opining on legal transactions, and 
engaged in legal minimization of regulatory or tax burdens, to think holistically about the social 
effects of her actions as part of a system of coordinated actions by others (including the client).  
She should “take personal responsibility for the systemic consequences to which [her] actions 
63 David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 955 (1995).
64 See further discussion of this scenario in the text accompanying notes 89-97 infra.
65 See Luban, supra note 63, at 980:
When  I  talk  with  practicing  lawyers  or  law  students  about  rules 
forbidding lawyers from knowingly doing something improper on behalf 
of  clients,  the  retort  is  invariably  that  you  never  really  know  .  .  .  . 
Ironically,  lawyers  who  pride  themselves  on  their  common  sense 
practicality,  and  who  usually  have  no  patience  for  philosophical 
abstractions  and  paradoxes,  suddenly  embrace  a  wildly  implausible 
standard  of  Cartesian  certainty  –  roughly  equating  knowledge  with 
infallibility – whenever knowing something would prove inconvenient.
66 See Professor Luban's discussion of the lawyers' “contrived ignorance” in the O.P.M. client 
fraud case of the 1980's, in which the law firm closed millions of dollars of fraudulent loan transactions 
on behalf of its client, and did not blow the whistle, despite its awareness of client fraud in connection 
with previous loans it had closed.  Id. at 981.– 37 –
contribute, even if [her] contribution to those consequences is minimal,”
67 or, I should say, legal.  
In this “green” view, a lawyer who does not attend to the social consequences of participation in 
the clients' activities would be socially irresponsible, and hence unethical.  Presumably a system 
of ethical rules that required such a view of lawyers' responsibilities would mitigate the “legal 
transactions, bad consequences” problem.
Requiring lawyers to serve as the social conscience of the client, however, obviously 
raises fundamental questions about the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the 
traditional presumption of the primacy of the client's claim on the lawyer's loyalties.  It is entirely 
consistent with that claim to demand that a lawyer avoid participating in a client's wrongdoing, 
even passively through contrived ignorance or convenient blindness.  It is more difficult, 
however, to ask a lawyer to serve two masters when the client is not acting wrongfully, and when 
the other “master” is so poorly defined.  For this ethical reorientation to work, the “green” lawyer 
would have to resolve questions of definition (what is the public interest – or the third party 
interest – for which lawyers must also be advocates?), standard-setting (what consequences other 
than legality raise an issue for the lawyer?), balancing (how are client interests and public 
interests to be balanced?), and forseeability (what should a lawyer do when the social 
consequences of a cause of action are murky or debatable in principle).
68
67 Id. at 956.
68 Professor Luban recognizes the foreseeability problem when he points out that “criticizing 
lawyers because they did not take incalculable long-term effects into account during their representation 
of clients seems suspiciously like the specious wisdom of twenty-twenty hindsight.”  Id. at 978.  He cites 
as an example the criticism of M&A lawyers during the hostile takeover heyday of the 1980s.  Can it be 
assumed that if hostile takeovers were bad for the economy and society, then M&A lawyers representing 
bidders were socially irresponsible?  If takeovers turned out to be beneficial, productivity-enhancing 
transactions,  were  the  M&A  lawyers  representing  entrenched  management  the  socially  irresponsible 
ones?  Acknowledging this conundrum, Lubran concludes that– 38 –
In the absence of the adoption of some theory of “green” lawyering, however, what can 
we say about lawyers who were pretty much doing what business lawyers usually do - - solving 
business problems with legal technology, lowering the costs of regulatory compliance and 
advising their clients about what the law permits?
69  If that is all they did, was their contribution 
to the perfect storm culpable in a way that demands regulatory response, particularly in the form 
of a stronger whistleblowing mandate?
C.  “Merely” Negligent
Lawyers may also have contributed to the perfect storm in an entirely familiar way - -
through bad lawyering.  At least some of the lawyers who could have made a difference simply 
performed their jobs below an acceptable level of professional competence.  Perhaps the best 
known examples of malpractice in the recent scandals were the special investigations conducted 
by Simpson Thacher & Bartlett for Global Crossing and Vinson & Elkins for Enron in response 
Given  the  immense  uncertainties  involved  in  macro-economic 
forecasting,  however,  it  would  be  preposterous  to  hold  the  lawyers 
morally responsible for “getting it wrong.”  And if lawyers cannot be 
expected to get it right, they may as well give their clients the benefit of 
the  doubt  .  .  .  There  is  really  no  reply  to  this  excuse,  for  in  many 
instances it is absolutely right.
Id. at 979.  The situation of M&A lawyers is analogous to that of lawyers who constructed executive 
stock option compensation plans that created perverse incentives and 401(k) plans allowing excessive 
concentration of assets and limiting liquidity.  How can lawyers be expected to have foreseen the negative 
effects of legal transactions that most people thought actually were good for stockholders and employees?  
When the foreseeability problem is taken into account, the notion of “green” lawyering does not seem to 
pose a real solution to the problem of “legal transactions, bad consequences” as I have defined it.  It does, 
however, offer a much needed corrective to the more passive, ambiguous form of acting as a partner-in-
crime which seems to have been endemic in the recent cases.  There is an interesting question of whether 
the  lawyers'  role  in  structuring  deals,  providing  opinions  and  formulating  disclosures  falls  into  the 
category of “legal transactions, bad consequences,” or “contrived ignorance” of wrongful client behavior.
69 On the concept of the lawyer as “transactional cost engineer,” see Ronald J. Gilson, Value 
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L. J. 239 (1984).  For elaboration 
of the concept, see Mark A. Sargent, What Does it Take? The Hallmarks of a Business Lawyer, Bus. L. 
Today, July/August, 1996, at 11.– 39 –
to the allegations of whistleblowers.  In both cases, the negligence was compounded, or even 
caused by the firms' conflict of interest.  In a report
70 commissioned by independent directors of 
Global Crossing, the law firm Coudert Brothers found that Simpson Thacher's investigation of 
serious allegations about accounting and disclosure irregularities “failed to satisfy its 
professional responsibilities to Global Crossing.”
71 According to the report, Simpson Thacher 
failed to obtain critical documents and interview key executives involved in the questionable 
transactions,
72 failed to inform the outside auditor of the allegations in a timely fashion,
73 and 
neglected to pursue the investigation vigorously.
74  While Coudert Brothers found that the 
transactions were legitimate, if of little value to the company, and that Simpson Thacher did not 
intend to conceal any wrongdoing, the firm also found that Global Crossing “suffered significant 
injuries as a result” of the inadequacy of the investigation.
75  Their report concluded that “causes 
of action may be asserted against [Simpson Thacher] for malpractice and breach of fiduciary 
duty.”
76  This mess, their report argues, resulted at least in part from the conflict of interest 
70 See Global Crossing Report, supra note 13.
71 Id. at 47.
72 Id. at 37.
73 Id. at 45.
74 Id. at 40-41.
75 The Global Crossing Report concluded that the inadequate investigation and the delays it 
created “deprived the Company of the benefit of audited 2001 financial statements,” which had a negative 
impact on the valuation of the company in bankruptcy.  Global Crossing Report, supra note 13, at 45.  In 
addition,  the  Report  concluded  that  the  whistleblower's  allegations  “have  subjected  the  Company  to 
reputational damage and adverse regulatory scrutiny it would have been able to avoid or mitigate if 
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett had done its job.”  Id.
76 Global Crossing Report, supra note 13, at 47.– 40 –
created by a Simpson Thacher partner serving as Global Crossing's acting general counsel while 
remaining a partner during the investigation.
77
That a conflict of interest produced an inadequate special investigation is even more 
apparent in the case of Vinson & Elkins' investigation into the by-now famous allegations of 
whistleblower Sherron Watkins.
78  The firm conducted a highly limited investigation into serious 
allegations about conflicts of interest and accounting problems in Enron's transactions with the 
77 Id. at 42.
Brandon served in dual, concurrent capacities.  His loyalty did not run 
exclusively to the company.  It also ran to Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett, 
the law firm of which he remained a partner while he worked as the 
Company's  Acting  General  Counsel.      This  circularity  precipitated  a 
conflict  of  interest  when  Olafson's  allegations  were  not  adequately
investigated by Simpson Thacher & Bartlett.
Simpson Thacher has vigorously contested the Global Crossing Report's allegations.  In a statement to the 
press, the firm asserted that:
The report is inaccurate and makes no sense.  It unfairly faults Simpson 
Thacher for not inquiring thoroughly into accounting allegations that the 
committee itself and the outside auditors have concluded are meritless.  It 
suggests that Simpson, not the company, had the responsibility to bring 
these allegations to the attention of the auditors.  But it ignores the fact 
that,  at  our  first  opportunity,  we  advised  the  company  to  make  this 
disclosure to the auditors.  The company chose not to follow our advice.
Simpson Thacher: Report “Makes No Sense,” Leg. times, March 17, 2003, at 17.  Simpson Thacher has 
also  disputed  the  Report's  claim  that  the  bankrupt  company  could  have  been  able  to  obtain  audited 
financial statements but for the firm's allegedly inadequate investigation, and claimed that it was retained 
only to do an informal, purely internal investigation that the officers back-burnered as Global Crossing 
approached bankruptcy.  Otis Bilodeau, For Two Elites, a Family Feud, Leg. Times, March 17, 2003, at 
1.
For critical discussion of Simpson Thacher's performance in this matter, see Michelle Cottle, 
Private  Practice,  Why  No  One  Blames  the  Lawyers,  New  Republic,  Oct.  14,  2002,  at  12;  Susan  P. 
Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?, Forbes, Aug. 12, 2002, at 58.
78 Letter (originally anonymous) from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth L. Lay, Chief Executive 
Officer,  Enron  Corp.  (Aug.  14,  2002)  (hereinafter  Watkins  Letter)  available  at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs.enron/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf.– 41 –
numerous affiliated partnerships in which senior officers invested.
79  Vinson & Elkins' 
investigation consisted of a review of the relevant documents and interviews with some, but not 
all of the officers involved in the transactions, as well as its own lawyers and two partners of 
Arthur Andersen.
80  The firm apparently agreed with the CEO of Enron that there would be no 
second-guessing of Arthur Andersen's accounting advice, and that there would be neither 
detailed analysis of the transactions in question or a discovery-style inquiry.
81  While Vinson & 
Elkins ultimately found some conflicts of interest in the arrangements, and that their “bad 
cosmetics”
82 created “a serious risk of adverse publicity and litigation,” the firm concluded that 
“the facts disclosed do not, in our judgment, warrant a further widespread independent 
investigation by outside counsel and auditors.” 
83
Serious questions can be raised about whether an investigation so circumscribed from the 
outset could support such a positive conclusion.
84  It is not clear that such a pollyannaish 
79 For detailed (and highly critical) discussion of this investigation see Roger C. Cramton, Enron 
and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143, 162-67 (2002).
80 The limited, “preliminary” nature of the investigation is stated in the report setting forth 
Vinson & Elkins' conclusions.  See Letter of Max Hendricks III, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. to James V. 
Derrick, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Enron Corp. (Oct. 15, 2001) (hereinafter 
Hendrick Letter), available at 2001 WL 1764266, at *2.  See also Powers Report, supra note 11, at 80 
(describing the limited scope of the investigation).
81 Hendricks Letter, supra note 80 at *1.
82 Id. at *9.
83 Id. at *8.
84 Id.  at  *6.    Vinson  &  Elkins  apparently  drew  solace  from  the  fact  that  “the  individuals 
interviewed  were virtually uniform in stating that LJM provided a convenient alternative equity partner 
with  flexibility,”  and  that  “both  the  awkwardness  and  potential  for  conflict  of  interest  should  be 
eliminated on a going-forward basis as a result of Mr. Fastow's divestment of his ownership interest in the 
LJM  partnerships.”    Id.    It  is  not  clear  why  the  recognition  of  a  putative  business  purpose  and  the 
elimination of future conflicts of interest should have reconciled the firm to relying on the judgment of 
individuals who were so obviously conflicted.– 42 –
determination would have been reached if a thorough, professionally competent investigation 
had been conducted.  Particularly remarkable was the firm's apparent willingness to base its 
conclusion on the finding that “none of the individuals interviewed could identify any transaction 
between Enron and LJM that was not reasonable from Enron's standpoint or contrary to Enron's 
best interests,”
85 despite the personal interest the same individuals had in the transactions.  Even 
more clear-cut was the law firm's utter insensitivity to the problems identified by Watkins in her 
letter to the CEO that triggered the investigation: “Can't use V & E due to conflict, they provided 
some ‘true sale’ opinions on some of the deals.”
86  Vinson & Elkins' willingness to provide 
allegedly disinterested reassurance to its client about deals in which it provided an essential legal 
opinion
87 is hardly consistent with its basic obligations to the client of loyalty and due care.
88
85 Watkins Letter, supra note 78, at 6.
86 “True sale” opinions are essential to the securitization of assets.  A law firm must opine that 
the assets to be securitized have “truly” been sold to the entity that will hold them.  The opinion should 
not be given unless the firm can make the legal determination that the assets have been separated from the 
originator who wants to securitize them.  If they have not been legally severed, and the originator enters 
bankruptcy, the assets will be included within the bankrupt's estate, and the bondholders who relied on the 
assets for security will lose that security.  For discussion of the problems with the true sale opinions 
issued by Vinson & Elkins and other firms for Enron's benefit, see Otis Bilodeau, New Questions Over 
Lawyering in Enron, Leg. Times, Sept. 30, 2002, at 1.
87 Vinson & Elkins' willingness to provide such reassurances about transactions in which it 
played such a crucial is especially remarkable in light of its own acknowledgment that the accounting 
treatment for the transactions was “creative and aggressive.”  The law firm has defended its undertaking 
of the investigation on the ground that the client exercised its right to waive any conflict of interest on the 
part of the firm.  Professor Cramton has argued, however, that the waiver on behalf of the corporate client 
may  have  been  given  by  the  CEO  and  the  general  counsel,  both  of  whom  were  implicated  in  the 
misconduct alleged by Watkins, thus invalidating the waiver.  Professor Cramton argues further that even 
if the consent was valid, the firm's investigation failed to meet “the objective standard that the lawyer 
reasonably believe the representation will not be adversely affected by the lawyer's conflict of interest.”  
Cramton, supra note 78, at 164.  For a summary of Vinson & Elkins' various defenses of its work for 
Enron, see Otis Bilodeau, Vinson & Elkins Shoots Back, Leg. Times, Feb. 11, 2002, at 17.
88 For discussion of failure to report wrongdoing to the board as both negligence and an ethical 
violation, and citation of the relevant sources, see Cramton, supra note 79 at 154-56.– 43 –
More generally, to the extent that attorneys for public corporations failed to advise their 
boards about conflicts of interest in officers' self-dealing transactions such as sweetheart loans, 
usurpation of corporate opportunities, spurious bonuses and excessive compensation, they were 
negligent in meeting their professional obligations to the board which, after all, is the 
embodiment of their client, not the officers who hired them.  To put it another way, the 
attorneys’ failure to blow the whistle internally on wrongdoing by corporate officers and other 
senior employees was simply negligence. If that negligence injured the corporate client, those 
lawyers would be subject to negligence actions brought by newly independent boards, 
shareholders in derivative actions, or receivers in bankruptcy asserting the corporation's claims 
for the benefit of the creditors.  We may conclude, therefore, that part of the lawyers' 
contribution to the perfect storm was essentially an epidemic of bad, negligent lawyering.
When the negligence explanation is joined to the other two possible descriptions of the 
role of lawyers in the perfect storm - - partners in crime and legal transactions, bad consequences 
- - we have a multi-faceted description of the lawyers' contribution to the systems breakdowns 
that afflicted corporate America.   That description, however, does not adequately explain the 
full range of lawyers' failures in Enron and its successors.
III. THE COMMON THREAD: “SEE NO EVIL”
At the extremes, the culpability of lawyers who contributed to the frauds and breaches of 
fiduciary duty characteristic of Enron and its successors is clear.  When lawyers knowingly and 
intentionally participate in and facilitate clients' wrongful acts, and benefit either directly from 
the ill-gotten gains or indirectly through fees, they have crossed the line.  Civil and, where 
appropriate, criminal liability can only be expected.  In deciding what to do about such cases 
there is no moral conundrum, theoretical problem or legal/doctrinal issue.  There is only the – 44 –
specific problem of establishing the facts in individual cases and the more general problem of 
figuring out why there was so much of this behavior in the profession.
At the other extreme, those lawyers who provided legitimate advice on transactions that
generated bad consequences would seem to have little culpability, absent a “green” reformation 
of legal ethics.  If the bad consequences flowed from defects in the legal rules permitting the 
transactions, or if they reflected bad business judgment by the clients, or if the clients 
manipulated the transactions in a way not anticipated by the lawyer, there is little for which the 
lawyer can be held accountable.
In between those extremes, however, there is much that needs further analysis.  Between 
the extremes, for example, are the following scenarios:
(1) Willful refusal to recognize wrongful behavior by the client, particularly when the 
client relationship is lucrative.  Such contrived ignorance is a passive, although 
perhaps ambiguous version of the partners-in-crime scenario.  Vinson & Elkins' role 
in the structuring of and preparing disclosures about Enron's SPEs may be a case in 
point.
(2) Pushing the envelope in providing advice and legal opinions on transactions at the 
edge of legality, particularly when the opinion provider is conflicted by multiple 
roles in the transaction.  The opinions provided by Akin Gump and Nelson McKee 
on Enron's (and others') tax shelter transactions are cases in point.
(3) Negligent representation that involves inadequate inquiry into questionable 
transactions, particularly when the lawyer is compromised by a conflict of interest, 
as was the case in different ways in Simpson Thacher's investigation of Global 
Crossing and Vinson & Elkins' investigation of Enron's affiliate transactions.
(4) Negligent failure to fully inform and warn boards of directors of the dangers 
inherent in corporate transactions from which the officers will benefit (Enron, 
Adelphia).
All of these scenarios led to injuries to the corporations the lawyers served, as well as 
their shareholders.  Whether such behavior will subject the lawyers involved to civil or criminal 
liability under the federal securities laws, malpractice liability, or liability on other grounds – 45 –
remains to be seen.  What is interesting about these scenarios, however, is their common thread.  
The reluctance, or inability, of lawyers to recognize, confront and act upon questionable or even 
wrongful acts by their clients was a failure on their part.  In many of these cases, sophisticated 
lawyers seemed determined to see no evil.
The determination to see no evil is nothing new, and has been recognized before.  It 
seems to have been endemic among the lawyers involved in the savings & loan collapses of the 
1980s.
89  The tendency to see no evil also has many causes.  It may be a problem of social 
cognition, which arises when a lawyer has internalized the client's worldview, or ego-identified 
with the client, preventing the lawyer from seeing the world as it really is.
90  It may in some 
89 See Judge Stanley Sporkin's famous cri de coeur in Lincoln Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Wall, 
743 F. Supp. 901, 920 D.D.C. (1990):
The questions that must be asked are:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting their rights 
under  the  Fifth  Amendment,  when  these  clearly  improper  transactions  were  being 
consummated?
Why  didn't  any  of  them  speak  up  or  disassociate  themselves  from  the 
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions 
were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved 
(both accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown the 
whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
For analyses of the role of lawyers in the savings and loan cases, see Symposium: The Attorney-
Client Relationship in a Regulated Society, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 571 (1994); In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays and Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of 
Law, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 977 (1993).
90 The problem of how the dynamics of social cognition influences lawyers' ability to recognize 
and respond to wrongdoing by clients has been analyzed in great detail by Professor Donald Langevoort.  
See  Donald  C.  Langevoort,  Where  Were  the  Lawyers?    A  Behavioral  Inquiry  Into  Lawyers' 
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 95-110 (1993).– 46 –
cases be a result of the compartmentalization of legal work by a large company that prevents one 
law firm from having a complete picture of what is actually going on, assigning different firms 
pieces of complex transactions, or different transactions in a series of deals.  The rapid turnover 
of deals, the haste to produce public disclosure, and delegation by large, busy firms of important 
work to inexperienced lawyers
91 may all produce blind spots, particularly when the client's work 
was extraordinarily complex and novel, as was Enron's.
Some blindness is entirely purposeful.  It is a kind of structural or role-blindness, a 
suspension of judgment about what a client does that allows the lawyer to disclaim any 
responsibility, on the theory that the lawyer is providing only a narrow “technical” opinion on 
the law, and that what the client does with it is the client's decision and responsibility.  There are 
a couple of problems with this theory.  First of all, it presumes disingenuously that the lawyer is 
playing a limited, passive role in the structuring of the transactions and deciding how to handle 
them.  As Enron’s lawyers' active promotion of the company’s tax shelters shows, this is 
sometimes not the case.
92  Even if those cases represent an unusually blatant conflict between 
promoting deals and providing allegedly disinterested opinions on those deals, it is not at all 
unusual for transactional lawyers to play a lead role in devising deal structures.  Attorneys know 
91 A case in point may be a two-page letter agreement amending a loan agreement that was 
drafted by a fourth-year associate at Vinson & Elkins relating to the transfer of $6.6 million from Enron 
to Chewco Investments, a major Enron affiliate.  Once Arthur Andersen became aware of the letter, it 
determined that  Chewco's  putatively  off-balance  sheet  liabilities  would  have to  be  consolidated  with
Enron's, with disastrous consequences for Enron.  See Powers Report, supra note 11, at 52-53.  For 
discussion of Vinson & Elkin's role in preparing this letter agreement, see Douglas McCollam, Vinson's 
Smoking Gun, Am. Law, March 6, 2002 at 20.  Vinson & Elkin has denied that it had the responsibility 
for disclosing the fatal side agreement to the auditor.  Letter to the Editor: Vinson & Elkins Responds, 
Am. Law., March 6, 2002, at 15 (letter of Harry Reasoner).  Regardless of what Vinson & Elkins was 
required to do for purposes of determining any malpractice liability, there is an interesting question of 
whether  a  more  experienced  lawyer  would  have  recognized  the  dangerous  implications  of  the  letter 
agreement and raised a question with the client and/or the auditor.
92 See notes 60-61 supra.– 47 –
exactly what their clients are doing because their advice makes it possible.  Furthermore, that 
theory embodies a stunted view of the lawyer's role.  Instead of providing independent 
professional judgment, which should be the professional norm, some “lawyers take the position 
that they must do everything that the client's managers want them to do, providing the conduct is 
permitted by law.”
93  The problem with this definition of the lawyer's role, as Professor Roger 
Cramton has pointed out, is that “by constantly going to the edge of the law and taking a very 
permissive view of what the law permits, these lawyers gradually adopt a mindset that ignores 
and may eventually assist the client's managers in illegality that harms third persons and the 
client entity.”
94 The lawyer who becomes used to walking on the edge, and leaving the client to 
face the risk of liability, dulls his sensitivity to the permeability of the line between the legal and 
illegal, the moral and immoral, and becomes, gradually but inevitably, a blind man whose stock 
in trade is his own blindness.
The most important reason for blindness to wrongdoing, however, is simpler.  Seeing evil 
is costly.  Because it is costly, people tend to avoid seeing evil.  If they see it, they convince 
themselves they did not see it, or at least pretend they did not.  If they cannot pretend, they begin 
the process of rationalization, for which human beings have an almost infinite capacity.  They 
conclude that the problem was not really that bad, that the problem was anomalous, or localized 
and not systemic, or, optimistically, that the problem will take care of itself, disappear over time, 
or never be discovered.  People, including lawyers whose professional training should prevent it, 
fall back on these devices when they come to appreciate the true costliness of seeing evil.
93 Cramton, supra note 79, at 173.
94 Id. – 48 –
The costliness has many levels, and needs to be understood as something more than a 
threat to lawyers' or law firms' greed.  There is, for example, an emotional cost.  Recognition that 
a client is asking one to participate in, approve, or cover up questionable or wrongful acts will jar 
even a cynical lawyer's sense of the ordinary air of legitimacy that surrounds our everyday 
professional life.  Suddenly, the people who seemed to be reliable, trustworthy and well-
intentioned colleagues are now “problems.”  Awkward accusations and embarrassment seem 
inevitable.  Reluctance to deal with such problems, especially ones that require confrontation 
with the client, is common when the lawyer's instinct is to present the client with solutions, not 
problems.  The lawyer wants to appear as a problem solver who has internalized the values and 
goals of the firm, not a bomb-thrower.  Similarly, a lawyer's status with the firm depends on his 
ability not just to attract clients, but to keep them happy.  Recognition of a “problem,” therefore, 
creates emotionally fraught role-strain within the attorney-client relationship and status anxiety 
for lawyers operating within firms.  That some lawyers conclude that it is better not to see 
anything is not surprising.
Another emotional cost may be anxiety about injury both to one's amour propre and one's 
external reputation.  It may be exquisitely painful for some lawyers to admit that they have 
become involved with something questionable.
95Langevoort, supra note 90, at 102-03.  It may be 
impossible for them to admit that their advice (or that of their partners) was tainted by a conflict 
of interest, that their opinion letter pushed the limits of the law too far, or that they failed to 
95 As Professor Langevoort has put it, 
When people  voluntarily commit  themselves to a  certain  position,  attitude  or 
belief,  the  subsequent  discovery  of  information  that  indicates  harmful  consequences 
flowing from that commitment directly threatens their self-concept as good, worthwhile 
individuals.  Thus cognitive processes will work to suppress such information if at all 
possible.– 49 –
pursue an issue or an investigation as vigorously as they should.  Recognition that their 
involvement contributed materially to a client's wrongdoing may be too much for some lawyers 
to bear.  They also might not be able to bear thinking about the potential threat to their 
professional reputation.  Because these emotional costs are so high, some lawyers will 
consciously or unconsciously close their eyes to the problem and indulge in all manners of 
rationalization.  The short-term benefit will be outweighed by the long-term cost, but for some, 
this is not the sphere of rational decision-making, despite lawyers' training in dispassionate 
analysis.
Other costs are economic, but even these are complex.  Recognition of a problem may 
result in a loss of “sunk costs.”  By the time a serious problem is recognized, the lawyer and her 
firm may have sunk considerable amounts of time into a transaction or an ongoing relationship 
with a client.  That time and its attendant expenses may be never paid if the lawyer surfaces 
problems that might unravel the transaction or even the client.  If the sunk costs are considerable, 
lawyers may decide that keeping silent and hoping it all works out for the best are the only 
options.  This concern about sunk costs would be particularly intense, for example, for the law 
firms engaged in promoting corporate tax shelters, because their investment is not just in specific 
transactions but in a whole line of business involving many clients.  This is especially true when 
it starts to become clear that the essence of the law firm's services entailed serious conflicts of 
interest and opinions at the outer edge of plausibility.
The question of economic cost is also complicated by the potentially conflicting interests 
of individual lawyers representing problematic clients and the law firm as a whole.
96  A lawyer 
96 A similar point has been made about conflicts within accounting firms between the interests of 
an individual partner or partners and the firm, using the behavior of the partners in Arthur Andersen's 
Houston office, who were highly dependent on Enron revenues: “Andersen's Houston office gambled – 50 –
whose book of business and personal income is dominated by the problematic client is going to 
bear a disproportionate share of any loss generated by alienating the client or killing a deal or 
series of deals.  While no firm wants to alienate a client or compromise sources of revenue, the 
firm's other sources of revenue will make the losses more bearable.  The firm thus may have a 
more objective appreciation of the long-term risks for the firm, which might be much greater 
than the short-term risk to the individual lawyer of losing his major client.  Hence, law firms may 
be particularly vulnerable when the anxiety of the partner-in-charge about loss to himself 
outweighs his sense of the potential cost to the firm.  Of course, this distinction evaporates when 
the problematic client is also one of the firm's major clients.  Firms in that situation then tend to 
think like partners in charge, and begin making calculations about the comparative risk of 
relatively certain short-term losses versus larger, but more speculative long-term losses.
The final aspect of the question of economic cost is perhaps the simplest.  Some lawyers 
simply cannot stand to see their greed unfulfilled.  Surrounded by corporate princes rolling in 
wealth often created as if by magic, they fall prey to the corruption of envy, as the princes' 
lawyers ask “why not me?”  Their sense of entitlement makes it very hard indeed to take the 
actions that would destroy their dreams of wealth.
This discussion should not end, however, with simplistic, censorious assumptions about 
the prevalence of personal greed, although there was apparently plenty of that.
97Id.  The tragedy 
with the reputation of the partnership as a whole in order to maintain the revenue flow from its profit 
center.”  Bratton, supra note 6, at ___.
97 Professor Langevoort also cautions against simplistic assumptions of venality (or stupidity) on
the part of lawyers, arguing that “venality competes not so much with stupidity as with honest, even good 
faith  behavior  that  only  in  hindsight  seems  incredible.”    Langevoort,  supra  note  90,  at  78.    For 
Langevoort,  the  key  obstacles to  lawyers'  recognition  of  clients'  wrongful  acts  are the  “blind  spots” 
created by lawyers' problems of social cognition, as he argues for recognition of– 51 –
of the lawyers' failures in these cases is that many of the lawyers involved were not consumed 
with greed, but were simply doing their best, often under great pressure and uncertainty, to keep 
their firms afloat by trying to feed the large law firm's endless appetite for billable hours and 
fees.  The economic demands of sustaining a large law firm had a gradually corrosive effect, 
numbing not just a lawyer's sense of decency but also his own sense of self-preservation as he 
succumbs to avoidance of the truth and rationalization of his client's and his own legal and moral 
failures.
IV.  THE REGULATORY RESPONSE: FORCING THEM TO SEE
A. Section 307 and the SEC Rules
In the summer of 2002, Congress enacted section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
98
Section 307 of the Act directs the SEC to issue rules setting forth minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way 
in the representation of issuers, which includes attorneys advising corporations registering 
securities with the SEC, hence all public companies.
99  Those standards were to include a rule 
requiring such attorneys to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent to the chief legal counsel or 
CEO.
100  That rule also was to require the attorney to report the evidence to the audit or other 
the possibility that lawyers have a diminished cognitive capacity to appreciate the likely 
harm flowing from their client's actions.  Both ego and stress can induce blind spots.  By 
the time the lawyer actually becomes aware of the wrong, his or her complicity already is 
fixed.  Denial and rationalization ensue.  Only at the very late stages, if at all, is there 
something like a conscious cover-up.
98 15 U.S.C.A. ___ §307 (2003).
99 17 C.F.R. §205.2(a) (2003).
100 15 U.S.C.A. ___ §307(1) (2003).– 52 –
appropriate committee or to the board as a whole if the chief legal counsel or CEO does not 
appropriately respond to the evidence.
101
In November 2002, the SEC proposed rules implementing the Congressional mandate for 
so-called “up the ladder” reporting that included a complex set of definitions, standards and 
procedures.
102 The Commission went beyond that mandate, however, and also proposed a so-
called “noisy withdrawal” requirement.
103  If the attorney representing an issuer reports the 
matter all the way up the ladder within the issuer and does not receive an appropriate response 
from the issuer's directors, and if the material violation is ongoing or about to occur and is likely 
to result in substantial injury to the issuer or an investor, the attorney will be required to 
withdraw from the representation and notify the Commission that such withdrawal was made for 
“professional considerations.”
104
As might be expected, the SEC's proposed rules, particularly the noisy withdrawal 
provisions, provoked an outpouring of formal letters of comment from the bar (mostly con) and 
the legal academy (mostly pro).
105  The rules, as finally adopted by the Commission on January 
101 15 U.S.C.A. ___ §307(2) (2003).
102 See Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC 
Rel. Nos. 33-8150, 34-46868 and IC-25829 (Nov. 21, 2002). 67 Fed. Reg. 1670 (Dec. 2, 2002) available 
at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm.  The only alternative to the process of reporting to the chief 
legal counsel or executive officer and to the audit committee or board is reporting to a “Qualified Legal 
Compliance  Committee”  composed  of  non-employee  directors,  if  the  issuer  has  established  such  a 
committee.  17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1(k), 205.3(c) (2003).
103 Id. at ___.
104 Id. at ___.
105 The comment letters are available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/S4502.shtml.– 53 –
23, 2003,
106 included somewhat modified versions of the up-the-ladder provisions but did not 
include the proposed noisy withdrawal provisions.  Instead, the SEC deferred decision on its 
initial proposal and proposed an alternative that would still require the attorney to withdraw for 
“professional considerations,” but require the issuer to report the withdrawal to the SEC.
107  That 
proposal is still pending as of this writing.
B. Forcing Them to See
How will section 307 force lawyers to see the evil they would prefer not to see?  It aims 
to do so by making not seeing more costly than seeing.  By imposing an affirmative whistle-
blowing obligation, and applying sanctions to lawyers who fail to meet that obligation, the rules 
are intended to make it more difficult to indulge in willful ignorance, negligent evasion, and 
insensitivity to their own conflicts of interest that constituted the great middle range of lawyers' 
failures I have just described.
More concretely, the existence of this obligation may spur the creation of internal 
systems within law firms for identifying potential client wrongdoing and responding more self-
consciously and with more levels of review.  Systems of that type may reduce the vulnerability 
of law firms to the poor decisions of partners whose individual stakes in a client have 
compromised their objectivity.  In other words, the rules may lead to the establishment of 
institutional bulwarks against avoidance and rationalization.
106 See Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC 
Rel. Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, IC-25919 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
107 See Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC 
Rel. Nos. 33-8186, 34-47282, IC-25920 (Jan. 29, 2003), 86 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm, at ___.– 54 –
The rules are likely to have their greatest influence in ambiguous situations involving 
lawyers' passivity.  Presumably, the reporting mandate would make it more difficult to fall back 
on protestations of ignorance of client wrongdoing.  The rules would not have much effect on a 
lawyer who has decided to participate in a client's misdeeds and share in their benefits, but it 
may influence those who have half-convinced themselves that they and their clients are not doing 
anything wrong.
While the rules seem to impose new constraints on lawyers' discretion, they actually 
seem intended to empower lawyers in their roles as both advocates and gatekeepers.  The up-the-
ladder internal reporting requirement directly addresses the tendency of lawyers from outside 
firms to identify the senior managers who hired them as the client, rather than the board.  It also 
provides some check on the apparent tendency of some general counsel to maintain insufficiently 
critical detachment from officers and other senior managers, preventing them from giving the 
board the frank advice it needed to perform its own monitoring function.
108  To the extent that 
senior managers controlled the lawyers, such lawyers failed to meet their obligations as 
advocates for the corporation, the real client.  The up-the-ladder reporting requirement, therefore, 
does not do any violence to the confidence and trust a corporate client should be able to place in 
its advocate, and might make lawyers more effective advocates for the real client by making sure 
that those involved in violating the law know that their lawyers ultimately will have to raise 
questions with disinterested decisionmakers.  The apparent futility of the few attempts by 
108  The alleged failure of the Tyco general counsel to disentangle himself from the CEO's self-
dealing, and to advise the board properly, helped lead to his indictment.  See note ___ supra.  James V. 
Derrick , Jr., Enron's general counsel, also has been criticized for being too deferential to the CEO and 
CFO who were most involved in the questionable self-dealing transactions with Enron's affiliated entities.  
See Miriam Rozen, An Unenviable Position, Tex. Law., Feb. 6, 2002, at ___, ___.– 55 –
lawyers and others to raise questions internally in the recent cases
109 suggests that the 
whistleblower's position needs to be fortified.  Lawyers may even find that this leverage is 
helpful, because it seems clear that they cannot use the defense of futility to a charge of breach of 
fiduciary duty when it is clear that they should have withheld cooperation and raised questions 
up the ladder.
110
By attempting to compel lawyers to represent their clients more effectively, the up-the-
ladder requirement is also intended to make them more effective gatekeepers.  By honoring their 
obligation to convey evidence of wrongdoing to disinterested decisionmakers charged with 
considering the evidence, the rules theoretically will enable, indeed require, the board to take 
appropriate and timely action.  The board's action will not only protect the corporation from 
potential liability, but also will help protect the shareholders and the investing public from fraud 
and the consequences of senior managers' breaches of fiduciary duty.  The presence of a noisy 
withdrawal requirement, furthermore, would provide an ultimate fail-safe, designed to ensure 
109 For example, key Enron executives apparently wanted an in-house lawyer fired because he 
attempted to negotiate vigorously on behalf of the corporation in dealings with an affiliated entity in 
which the CFO (their supervisor) had a major personal interest.  Tom Hamburger and John Emshwiller, 
Enron Officials Wanted In-house Lawyer Fired Due to Partnership Negotiations, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2002, 
at  A3.    When that  lawyer's  supervisor,  the  general  counsel  of  Enron  Global Finance,  raised  serious 
questions about both the conflicts of interest and accounting in that and other transactions in which senior 
officers had stakes, he was essentially ignored.  Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Lawyer Warned Enron Officials of 
Dubious Deals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2002, at ___.  A junior accountant at HealthSouth also had little luck 
in getting the company's auditor to take seriously his claims that the company was falsifying assets.  See 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Accountant Tried in Vain to Expose HealthSouth Fraud, Wall St. J., May 20, 2003, 
at A1.
110 See In re American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Savings and Loan Securities Litigation, 
794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Az. 1992)
Jones Day contends that it would have been futile to act on these 
fiduciary obligations because those controlling ACC/Lincoln would not 
have  responded.    Client  wrongdoing,  however,  cannot  negate  an 
attorney's fiduciary duty.– 56 –
that boards confronted with a serious problem actually meet their responsibility to do something 
about it.
All of that seems to be the theory behind the section 307 rules as originally proposed.  
They were intended to force lawyers to see, or at least give them an incentive to see, and to do 
something about what they see.  This goal is laudable.  The rules are a worthy experiment, but 
before declaring the experiment a success we should spend some time speculating about the 
rules' potential efficacy and importance.
V. SPECULATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In speculating about section 307 rules, it may be helpful to ask three questions.  First, 
how do the rules compare to other possible approaches to preventing the types of lawyer failures 
that surfaced in Enron and the other cases?  Second, are there internal problems with the rules 
that will make them less effective than they could be?  Third, will the rules have unintended, 
perverse consequences that will make lawyers even less effective as gatekeepers and a positive 
influence on corporate governance?
A.  Are There Better Approaches?
If we could design from scratch a legal framework that would make lawyers more 
accountable and better gatekeepers, what would it be?  It might include a whistle-blowing rule 
that includes both an up-the-ladder reporting requirement and a noisy withdrawal mandate, but 
other aspects might be more important.  While a whistleblowing rule addresses the see no evil 
problem, it does not address the partners-in-crime problem.  The key to reducing that behavior 
would require Congressional enactment of an aiding and abetting liability provision under the 
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws that would legislatively overrule Central – 57 –
Bank.
111  In addition, there would need to be a broader range for primary liability under the 
federal securities laws than currently exists.
112  These changes would create a greater 
disincentive for intentional participation in client wrongdoing.  A lawyer who has decided to 
engage in such behavior, as argued above,
113 is not likely to blow the whistle on a client when 
that would mean blowing the whistle on herself.  Fear of liability to private plaintiffs as to SEC 
enforcement action would be far more significant.
A fear of that kind of liability would also create greater incentives for avoiding the 
various types of see-no-evil behavior.  While avoiding recognition of client wrongdoing may not 
itself provide a basis for primary liability, it could conceivably be characterized as aiding and 
abetting under a legislatively-revived theory of such liability.  Once again, the fear of either 
private liability or public enforcement may have more of a deterrent effect than a whistle-
blowing requirement.  That fear of liability under the federal securities law would have a bracing 
effect on lawyers tempted to give questionable disclosures a pass.
It is also worth noting that section 307 and the SEC rules have an inherently limited 
scope.  There is no reporting requirement unless there is evidence of some kind of violation of 
law.  Even if this standard is broadly construed, the reporting obligation would have no impact 
on the legal transactions, bad consequences problem that arises when there is no law violation, 
but somehow the client's use of the lawyer's expertise produces malign results.  To the extent that 
111 For discussion of the holding in Central Bank, and an argument for statutory overruling of the 
decision in order to reestablish liability for damages in aiding and abetting cases, see Cramton, supra note 
79, at 169-70.
112 The scope of primary liability for securities fraud on the part of lawyers is currently quite 
limited. For analysis, see Cramton, supra note 79 at 170-73.  That range should at least include primary 
liability when the attorney drafts false representations relied upon by investors, even though he does so 
anonymously, if the attorney is aware of their falsity.  The courts are divided on this issue.  Id. at 169.
113 See text following note 50 supra.– 58 –
this is a problem, section 307 is no answer, because it is useful only when the lawyer confronts 
behavior such as fraud or self-dealing.  Section 307 and the SEC rules thus do not embody a 
belief that the corporate lawyer should recognize a duty to be the critical, public conscience of 
the client.  It can be debated whether a green revolution in lawyers' ethics is desirable, but it is 
indisputable that section 307 does not start one.
B.  Internal Problems With the Rules
As of this writing, the SEC has not yet determined whether it will adopt the proposed 
noisy withdrawal requirement.  If it does not, the impact of the up-the-ladder requirement will 
not be as profound as Congress and the SEC hoped.  An up-the-ladder reporting requirement 
may not have real much influence without the threat of mandatory noisy withdrawal behind it.  
Lawyers may take their obligations seriously, but if the board or key members of the board are 
unwilling (or unable) to respond constructively to an attorney-whistleblower's allegations, only 
the threat of required noisy withdrawal will wake them up.  This observation is not a conclusion 
that requiring noisy withdrawal is necessarily a good idea, because requiring it might make the 
perverse consequences described in the next subsection even more likely.  It is a prediction, 
however, that the up-the-ladder requirement alone may not have much effect on lawyers' 
behavior.
114
114 The potential tension between the SEC’s present permissive disclosure rule and state rules that 
are more restrictive of disclosure of client information was seen recently in a proposed interim formal 
ethics  opinion  issued  in  July  2003  by  the  Washington  State  Bar  Association.    The  opinion  warned 
Washington lawyers not to disclose to the SEC information that the SEC’s rules would permit them to 
disclose, unless the disclosure is also allowed by the state’s own professional conduct rules.  Those rules 
permit disclosure of client confidence only to “prevent the client from committing a crime.” The opinion 
also states that a Washington attorney cannot avoid this limitation by claiming to be complying in good 
faith with the SEC’s rules, if the attorney acts contrary to the opinion.  Washington State Bar Association, 
Proposed Interim Formal Opinion [CITE], http://www.wsba.org/formalopinion.doc.  The SEC General 
Counsel responded to the Washington opinion with a public statement to the effect that the Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of conduct that diverge 
from  and  supersede  state  laws  addressing  the  same  conduct.    He  also  argued  that  an  attorney  who – 59 –
The effectiveness of the up-the-ladder reporting requirement may be compromised by the 
ambiguity of its key triggering provision.  The language of that provision leaves much wiggle 
room for interpreting away the lawyer's obligation to report up the ladder.  It is theoretically an 
objective standard for determining when an attorney has an obligation to report up the ladder, but 
the language is complex and confusing.  If an attorney concludes that there is credible evidence 
that would make it unreasonable for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is 
reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur, the 
attorney will have an obligation to report the evidence of the violation.  The words “credible,” 
“material” and “reasonably likely” leave plenty of room for judgment, or self-serving 
rationalization, depending upon how you look at it.  The use of the double negative in the 
formulation of the standard, furthermore, could create interpretive haze useful to justify 
inaction.
115 Some lawyers may not need much haziness in order to conclude that they do not 
have any obligation to take action.
discloses client information in good faith reliance on the SEC rule will also have a good faith exemption 
from  the  state’s  non-disclosure  rule  under  the  preemption  doctrine.    Giovannia  P.  Prezioso,  Public 
Statement by SEC official: Letter Regarding Washington State Bar Association’s Proposed Opinion on
the  Effect  of  the  SEC’s  Attorney  Conduct  Rules  (July  23,  2003) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm.
The question of the relationship between permissive or mandatory external disclosure rules under 
the SEC and state rules governing disclosure of client information is complex, in part because of the great 
variation in the state rules.  For a discussion of the variations, see Cramton, supra note __, at 156-58.  For 
a discussion of the background to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) struggles with this issue, see 
Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality and the Organizational Client, 58 Bus. Law. 123 (2002).  
In August of 2003 the ABA finally amended Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to 
follow the lead of many states in allowing the disclosure of client information when the lawyer believes 
such  disclosure  necessary  to  prevent  fraud  injurious  to  a  third  party’s  financial  interests.  See 
http://www.abanet.org/media/aug03/081203_1.html.  The ABA’s initiative on this point may make the 
SEC feel less obligated to adopt a mandatory noisy withdrawal rule.
115 See 17 C.F.R. §205(e)(2003).– 60 –
C.  The Possibility of Perverse Consequences
Let's assume for the sake of argument that the section 307 rules actually work, the 
lawyers and clients come to believe that the rules effectively compel lawyers to be much more 
aggressive about reporting corporate wrongdoing, making it much more likely that the 
wrongdoing will become public.  The hope, of course, is that lawyers will become more effective 
gatekeepers, ultimately reduce the amount of self-dealing and securities fraud perpetrated by the 
managers of public corporations.  It is worth considering the possibility, however, that imposing 
a reporting requirement with teeth, particularly a noisy withdrawal requirement, may have the 
opposite effect.
Managers concerned about the possibility of exposure by their lawyers may tend to 
marginalize the role of lawyers in their activities.  Corporate managers may exclude lawyers 
from their most sensitive discussions.  They may divide legal work among a larger number of 
firms, creating a compartmentalization that prevents anyone from developing a sense of the 
whole picture.  Once a new type of transaction is developed with lawyers' assistance, clients may 
exclude lawyers from future iterations, as the client manipulates the transaction in ways the 
lawyers would not have expected or approved.  Managers also may engage in even more 
determined efforts to hide the true facts from their lawyers.  The net result is that lawyers might 
have less of an opportunity to influence their clients' actions positively than they do now.
Law firms themselves may even attempt to reduce the possibility that they would 
encounter something that they would have to report.  Firms are likely to establish “Section 307 
committees” and procedures that routinize consideration of whether there might be reportable 
evidence of a material violation upon which the firm would be compelled to act.  That would 
seem to be a good thing.  It would seem, however, that firms, and their risk managers, are likely – 61 –
to use these committees and procedures to find ways of avoiding the situations in which they 
would have the uncomfortable responsibility of blowing a whistle.  For example, firms might 
circumscribe more narrowly the scope of their representation.  They may decline to take on tasks 
that require substantial due diligence.  They may increasingly define themselves as providing 
highly specific technical advice rather than independent professional judgment.  This would 
indeed be a perverse consequence.  The goal of the section 307 rules is to give lawyers an 
incentive to withhold cooperation from client wrongdoing and increase the risk of public 
exposure, thus making it more difficult and costly for clients to act wrongly.  If lawyers' fear of 
having to turn whistleblower causes them to absent themselves from the kinds of situation in 
which their duty of non-cooperation and reporting might be significant, little will have been 
accomplished.  Indeed, they might become less effective gatekeepers than they were.
It is too early, however, to predict that these perverse consequences will ensue, or, if they 
do, whether their effects will be marginal.  The dismal record of lawyers in Enron and its 
successors, and their material contribution to the systems failure I have called the perfect storm, 
suggests that the existing framework of legal rules and lawyers' private incentives for doing right 
are inadequate in the context of representing public companies.  The process of practical 
adaptation by both law firms and clients to the section 307 rules should tell us, before too long, 
whether anything has changed.